P SESHAGIRI RAO Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) 1. This is an application for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the order of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in G O Ms. No, 1350 (Home S.C.A) Department dt./9-8-1968 in the following circumstances The petitioner was working as a Subordinate Judge in the State Judicial Service. In view of certain allegations received against him, a preliminary enquiry was conducted by Sri Murahari Rao, District Judge, Kurnool. to find out whether there was a prima facie case for instituting disciplinary proceedings As a result of the preliminary enquiry, it was found that a regular departmental enquiry should be conducted against the petitioner. Accordingly the High Court appointed Sri C. V. Avadbani, District Judge, Mababoobnagar to frame charges and to conduct regular enquiry against the petitioner. A charge memo was served on the petitioner to show cause against the same and the petitioner submitted his written explanation against the said charges. After the enquiry was over, a second notice was issued by the competent authority, the Government asking the petitioner to show cause against the proposed punishment of removal from Service. The petitioner again submitted his second explanation challenging the correctness of the various findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer stating that there was no justification for taking any action against him After receiving the said explanation, the Government in its impugned order G. O. Ms, No, 1350 Home (SC-A) Department dt/ 9-8-1968, confirmed the punishment which was already indicated, namely, removal from service. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed the above writ petition in this Court.

(2.) The learned Counsel Sri K. G. Kannabhiram raised the following points for my consideration, The first point urged bv him was that the Enquiry Officer was not justified in conducting anv private enquiries behind the back oi the petitioner after the regular departmental enquiry has been initiated. I quite agree that as a proposition of law, the Enquiry Officer cannot make any private enquiries and make use of the said enquiries for the purpose of the case without putting the same to the petitioner, but no such things happened in this case. The actual complaint of the petitioner is that out of seven witnesses who were examined during the stags of the preliminary enquiry, one of the witnesses was given up and that before the witness was tendered for evidence at the trial, the Enquiry Officer interrogated him in 1 is Chambers and as a result of the said interrogation, be did not examine him It is common ground that in so far as the witnesses privately interrogated by the Enquiry Officer are concerced, the relevant charges were found to be not true. It is urged that irrespective of the result of the findings, the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer is opposed to principles of natural justice and that the manner of trial does not accord with the well- known rule that "though justice is done, it must be seem to be done". According to the rules, there is no independent officer to conduct the enquiry on behalf of the prosecution, The Enquiry Officer perfor ns a dual role namely that of a Judge and the prosecutor. But so long as he is authorised by the statutory rules, no exception can be taken to this procedure unless the Knquiry Officer while acting as a Judge has gone out of the way in stopping the proceedings and prompting the witness by taking him to the chambers. But what happened in this case, is, that even before the witness was brought to the court for the purpose of evidence, the Enquiry Officer had a talk with him in his chambers and decided that there is no useful purpose in examining him as a witness in support of the particular charge. In fact it is the Enquiry Officer who conducts the Chief Examination of the prosecution withnesses It is open to the Enquiry Officer not to press any particular charge at all. Hence he is equally entitled not to examine any particular witnes in support of the charge. His interrogation of his own witness was evidently for the purpose of deciding whether be should proceed with a particular charge or not. I therefore hold that there was no violation of principles of natural justice or miscarriage of justice as a result of what the Enquiry Officer did in the case. The decision in B.V Bodmin Justices (1) relied upon by the petitioner's learned counsel relates to entirely diSerent set of facts. After a witness gave evidence and declined to disclose certain facts, the judge ascertained the said facts privately in his chambers and. made use of the said information agains the accused while coming to his conclusions. I do not therefore, agree that me slid ruling applies to the facts of the present case.

(3.) The second contention raised is that in giving a finding in respect of a certain charge ot bribery, the learned Judge relied, for the purpose of corroboration, upon the statement given by one Subbaiah during the preliminary enquiry stage without examining the said Subbaiah as a witness at the regular enquiry. On a read ing of the relevant portion of the report of the Enquiry Officer, I do not find that the statement of Subbaiah was actually relied upon for the purpose of corroborating P. W. 1 and P. W. 9 though a casual reference was made to Subbaiah as being the person who arranged for the bribs. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that though the statement of Subbaiah was not relied upon specifically for the purpose of corroboration at the concluding Dart of the finding regarding the particular charge, a reference to his statement in the earlier portion of the report gives an indication that the Enquiry Officer was really placing reliance upon the said statement. As I have already stated, a reading of the report as regards the particular charge in its entirety does not give the impression that the said statement of Subbaiah was really used as a corroborative piece of evidence.