BHAGVATULA PULLAYYA Vs. M ANANDAM CHETTI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondent is the landlord of premises bearing door No. 327 in Gandhi Road, Tirupathi. He filed a petition for eviction of his tenant, the petitioner herein. under the provisions of Sections 10 92) (I), 10 (2) (ii), 10 (3) (a) and 10 (3) (b) of Andhra Pradesh Act 15 of 1960. He claimed to be put in possession on the several grounds mentioned in those provisions. Every one of the grounds raised by the landlord was contested by the tenant, who, in addition, claimed that the petition for eviction was liable to be dismissed as no maintenance as he had not been given any notice able as he had not been given any notice to quit in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act before filing of the petitioner for eviction. The Rent Controller held every one of the grounds on which the petition for eviction was based in favour of the landlord but nonetheless dismissed the petition as not maintainable on the ground that there was no prior notice to quit. The Rent Controller did not , however, award any costs but stated no reasons for not awarding costs. The landlord preferred an appeal to the appellate authority. Following a judgment of a Division Bench of this court, the appellate authority held that prior notice to quite was not necessary, The petitioner-tenant who was the respondent before the appellate authority, wanted to sustain the order of dismissal by the Rent Controller on merits, that is, on grounds which had been decided against him by the Rent Controller. The appellate authority did not permit him to do so on the ground that if the petitioner felt aggrieved by the adverse findings given by the Rent Controller, he should have preferred an appeal and in the absence of such an appeal he could not be allowed to question the finding in the appeal preferred by the opposite party. The appellate authority, therefore, allowed the appeal and order eviction.

(2.) In this revision, Sri A. V. Krishanrao, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that both on general principles and on the application of O. 41, Rs. 22, the petitioner had the right to seek to sustain the order of the Rent Controller before the appellate authority on points decided against him by the Rent Controller. He relied on the decisions in Seetaram v. Ramabai, AIR 1958 Madh Pra 221 and Hari Kishan Singh v B. Narayana. (1969) 2 APLJ 290.

(3.) On the other hand Sri S. V. K. S. Rangaswami Iyengar, learned counsel for the respondent, contended that the finding of the Rent Controller on each of the grounds raised in the petition for eviction was by itself an order against which the petitioner could have preferred an appeal; at any rate, the petitioner could have preferred an appeal against the refusal to award him costs. The failure of the petitioner to prefer an appeal made the findings final. The findings would operate as res judicata in a subsequent proceedings and the correctness of the findings could not be canvassed in an appeal preferred by the opposite party in the same proceeding. The learned counsel relied on the decisions in In re Bhogireddi Nagaraju, (1969) 1 APLJ 157 & Bansilal Patwa v. Lakshminarayan. (1969) 1 APLJ 408. The provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease Rent and Eviction) Control Act which are relevant for the purposes of this case are Sections 10, 20 and 21. Under Section 10 (1) of the Act a tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of Sections 10, 12 and 13. Under S. 10 (2) a landlord seeking to evict a tenant is enabled to apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf on any of the grounds mentioned in the several clauses of that sub-section. It the Controller is satisfied that any of the grounds exist. he shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. If the Controller is not satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application. Section 10 (3) enables the landlord to apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of a building which is required by him subject to the conditions mentioned in the sub-section. If the Controller is satisfied with the claim of the landlord as bona fide he may make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building and if the Controller is not satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application. It is, therefore, seen that the Controller may pass two kinds of orders. one an order rejecting an application and the other, an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. Section 10 (2) and 10 (3) do not contemplated any other type of order. Section 20 provides for appeals by persons aggrieved to the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court in the cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and elsewhere, to the principle Subordinate Judge having jurisdiction against orders passed by the Controller. Since the only orders which may be passed by the Controller in applications coming under Sec. 10 (2) and Section 10 (3) are orders rejecting the applications or orders directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession, it follows that appeals are competent only against such orders and not against mere findings. The order passed in the application to the Controller in the present case was one rejecting the application. Therefore, the landlord was competent to file an appeal to the Subordinate Judge. There was no order against the tenant directing him to put the landlord in possession and therefore, he was not competent to prefer an appeal to the Subordinate Judge. Section 21 of the Act provides for the award of costs in proceedings before the Controller or the appellate authority in the discretion of the Controller and the appellate authority. The explanation to Section 21 provides that the appellate authority may set aside and very any order passed by the Controller in regard to costs of the proceedings before the Controller. The explanation to Section 21 seems to invest the appellate authority, in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, with power to interfere with orders of the Controller in regard to costs, hat is to say, it appears to invest the appellate authority with power to interfere with orders made by the Controller in regard to costs where appeals are brought before the appellate authority against orders of the Controller. The explanation seems to be merely an amplification of the power of the appellate authority and does not appear to give a right to a party to prefer an appeal against an order relating to costs only. I was however, told by the learned counsel at the time of hearing of the Civil Revision Petition that Division Bench of this court has held that under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, an appeal law on the question of costs simpliciter. The case was not cited before me and though I am not satisfied that an appeal lies against an order relating to costs simpliciter I will proceed on the assumption that an appeal does so lie. Assuming that the petitioner could have preferred an appeal because the Rent Controller had refused to allow him costs could the petitioner have canvassed the correctness of the findings of the Controller on the grounds raised in the petition for eviction. The Controller did not say that he was disallowing costs to the petitioner because he had given findings against the petitioner on the merits of the case. If he had so stated perhaps the petitioner could have canvassed the findings before the appellate authority in an appeal preferred against the order relating to costs. But since the Controller did not state any such reasons the for disallowing costs I am of opinion that the petitioner could not have canvassed the findings against him by preferring an appeal against the order disallowing costs to him.