BUGGAVEETI RANGAIAH Vs. EXTENSION OFFICER PANCHAYATS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) 1. These two writ petitions have been presented by the same person and relate to the same controversy. The petitioner was holding office as Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat, Pammi, situate within the Khanmam Blocki His case is that a notice dated September, 21, 1966 issued by the Extension Officer, Panchayats, was served on him to the effect that a meeting of the Gram Panchayat was to be held on 27-9-1966 under the presidentship of the panchayat Extension Officer for the election of the Sarpanch for Pammi Gram Panchayat.

(2.) The averment of the petitioner in the affidavit filed by him in support of the writ petition No, 1626 of 1965, is that he had no knowledge of any order removing him from office and that it was a surprise to him to learn that a meeting of the Grarn Panchayat became necessary for the election of a Sarpanch, The basis of the writ petition is that no vacancy has, in fact, arisen and that he has not ceased to be the Sarpanch and consequently, the convening of a meeting for the election of a Sarpanch is beyond the competence of the Extension Officer, Panchayats.

(3.) In W. P. No: 1665 of 1956 filed by the same person, he questions the validity of the proceedings of the Collector dated September, 20, 1966, In the proceedings of the Collector, it is recited that the Extension Officer reported that the Sarpanch failed to convene meetings from 7-7-1965 to 6-10-1955. The Collector has taken the view that the omission to convene the meetings was a breach of a duty which attracted the provisions of Section 25 (2) of the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayats Act. The Collector directed the petitioner to hand over charge of the office of Sarpanch in as much as the peti. tioner ceased to be Sarpanch with effect from 5-10-1965, by the operation of Section 25 (2) of the Act, The contention of the petitioner in the writ petition is that no disqualification was incurred and that the penal provision under section 25 (2) did not come into play, because on a true construction of that provision, it could not be said there was a failure to hold meetings in three consecutive months.