PREM SINGH Vs. TAHSILDAR URBAN TALUK SYEDABDUL RAHIM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) (Order of the Bench Delivered by The Hon'ble the Chief Justice) 1. This is a petition for punishing the Tahsildar, Urban Taluk, Himayatnagar, Hyderabad and the Kevenue Inspector, Mushirabad Tahsil Office, Hyderabad district for contempt of Court. The petitioner was in possession of 12 guntas of land In S. No. 37 in the village Bakaram, Urban Taluk, The Tabsildar, Urban Taluk in exercise of his powers under the Land Encroachment Act called upon him to produce documentary proof of his right to the land On his failure to do so, within time fixed, he directed by virtue of the provisions of that Act, his eviction from the land. It is the case of the petitioner that aggrieved he that order he went in appeal to the Revenue Divisional officer and obtained stay order of eviction till 9-1-1970. Then he went to the Tahsildar on 3-1-1979 and intimated him, by presenting the letter of bis advocate, that the Revenue Divisional Officer had granted him stay The Tahsildar endorsed on the application filed that stay order be awaited till the evenining. He, in fact, waited till that evening and the next day and no staz order was forthcoming, Then he got his order executed by the Revenue Inspector on 5-1-1970. It is this eviction in alleged contravention of the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer that is said to constitute contempt of Court punishable under the Contempt of Courts Act.

(2.) Assuming that there was stay order and the Tahsildar contravened the same by causing execution of his own order, the question is whether this Act constitutes contempt of Court punishable under Sections of the Contempt of Courts Act XXXII of 1952). Prima Facie it may be so, if the officer exercising his functions under the Land Encroachment Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act (XXXII of 1952). As the question involved was of some legal significance we called upon the Prl. Government Pleader to address arguments on the point. The learned Government Pleader collected all the cases on the point and ably advanced bis arguments in this behalf. We are beholden to him for his assistance.

(3.) Now two points arise for consideration : (1) Whether a Reve nue Divisional Officer exercising his powers under the Land Encroa cbment Act is a Court (2) If so, whether it is one subordinate to this Court within the meaning of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act The Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 while defining in Section 2 the term "High Court" has omitted to define the word "court" or the expres, sion "contempt of Court". The Evidence Act, in Sec. 3 and the Indian Penal Code in Sec. 20 however, have defined the term "Court" and court of justice respectively. The first-mentioned has provided for an inclusive definition which is designed only for the purposes of that Act. So also the second mentioned which refers to "Court of Justice" and not to "Court". Both these definitions therefore are not of much assistance for our purpose. The term "court" however, has come up for judicial interpretation in several cases even before the highest court of the land. The earliest of these seems to be the Bharat Bank Ltd. Delhi v. The Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi and the Bharat Bank Employee's Union Delhi( 1 ). There the Supreme Court was not so much concerned with the expression "Court" as it was concerned with the expression "Tribunal". The question that arose there was whether "Industrial Tribunal" did fall within the scope of Art. 136 of the Constitution of India. Practically similar point had come up for decision in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha and Another v. Hind Cycles Ltd,,(2). There the question was whether an arbitrator acting under Sec. 10 A of the Industrial Disputes Act was within the ambit of Article 136. Article 136 of the Constitution of India, be it noted, is concerned not only with judgments or decisions of a Court but also of the Tribunal- Therefore the scope, meaning and effect of the terms "court" and "Tribunal" have been elaborately discussed in both these cases Both these expressions by no means are synonyms By "Courts" we generally mean courts constituted by the State as a part of ordinary hierarchy of courts which are invested with the State's in herent Judicial powers. They may be Courts exercising civil or criminal jurisdiction! A Magistrate exercising his powers as such is a criminal Murt. He is certainly within the hierarchy of courts mentioned in the Criminal Procedure Cod". But an executive officer such as Tahsildar or Revenue Divisional Officer performing his executive functions is not certainly in the hierarchy of Courts, The essential characteristic of the Court is that it exercises inherent judicial powers of the State and has power to give a definitive Judgment binding and authoritative. There is a vital difference between the Courts and the Tribunal, whether quasi-judicial or administrative, It may be that Tribunals exercise some judicial powers and decide matters brought before them judicially or quasi-judlclally and have thus the trappings of a Court but they do not constitute courts in the technical sense. The Tribunal may mean a seat of justice; but in the discharge of the functions it shares only some of the characterise tics of a Court. The difference between the two concepts may, somes times, owing to the functions performed, be thin but nevertheless, it is real and substantial. The need for these tribunals has arisen because of the complex problems of the modern social welfare State and vast expansions of social legirslation, Indeed the administrative and quasi-judicial tribunals of necessity have become a permanent feature of social and political system They are governmental bodies generally appertaining to the executive rather than judicial. Even so, in many matters they are clothed with judicial powers resembling those normally exercisable by courts of law. The functions they perform may be judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative or executive. The distinction between purely administrative or executive Acts and judicial or quasi-judicial acts has been pointed out by Mahajan, J (as he then was) in Province of Bombay v Kushaldas S, Advani(3), It was observed that it all depends on the particular rules and the nature and scope and effect of she particular powers in exercise of which the act may be done. It must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. But certain things, however, are basic and fundamental which give true shape to the nature of activities. Thus, Courts, quasi-judicial priunals, administrative Tribunals are distinct and separate from one another. Lord Sankev, L. C. in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (4) dealt with the distinction between judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative acts and in the light there of held that the Board of Review created by S. 41 of the Federal Income tax Assessment Act could not be held to be "Court" exercising judicial powers. The following remarks in the course of his judgment are of particular significance