BAHADURMULL Vs. VICARUNNISA BEGUM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises out of the dismissal by the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board, Hyderabad, of an application in Form No. 1 filed by Bahadurmull (Appellant) on 13th February, 1953, for the settlement of the debts due to him from Vicarunnisa Begum Jagirdara getting commutation from Khata No. 682. The Chairman and a Member of the Board, Sri Raja Gurudas, held the view which was not shared by the other Member of the Board, Sri Satyanarayana Loya, that the definition of a 'debt' as contained in the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act (Hyderabad Act "XII of 1952) would not be extended to mean all such liabilities which would be rejected by the Civil Courts on the grounds of limitation. The dissenting Member went on the basis that the application of the Limitation Act is excluded by this special enactment relating to Jagirdars and the claim of the creditor is sustainable if the application made by the creditor is within the time prescribed under section 11 of that Act. No definite finding, however, regarding the truth of the execution of the promissory notes has been recorded by the majority of the Debt Conciliation Board although the dissenting Member found that issue in favour of the appellant herein, It may even hereby noticed that the truth or otherwise of the execution of the promissory note has not been canvassed before us. But the controversy raised is only in respect of the question whether the claim based on the promissory notes are sustainable' for purposes of settlement of the debts of the Jagirdars. For the purposes of this appeal, it may therefore be taken that the debts under the promissory notes are true though time-barred and no suits could be laid in respect of them.

(2.) We are concerned in this appeal with the pronotes, Exhibits Nos. 100 and 101 executed on aist Isfandar, I358-F. corresponding to 2 ist January, 1949. These promissory notes bear no endorsements of payments ; nor those promissory notes kept alive by any valid acknowledgement by the debtor Jagirdara. The creditor however, relied on an alleged unendorsed payment of Rs. 50 by the Jagirdara on 15th November, 1952. Even this alleged payment would be beyond the period of three years from the date of the promissory notes. It is not in dispute between the parties that if a suit has to be filed on the promissory notes, it would be barred even by the time of the alleged payment of Rs. 50 as the period of three years provided under Article 62 of Schedule I of the Indian Limitation Act would have expired on 21st January, 1952. But the stand taken by the creditor (appellant) is that before the Board for the settlement of the dabts of Jagirdars the existence of a right of remedy in relation to the Limitation Act should not be considered as the criterion, but only the fact of the relationship of a creditor and debtor on account of the existence of any debt would alone matter, and therefore a creditor would always be entitled to have his debt considered by the Board for affording him relief without reference to the extinguishment of the remedy by the operation of the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act. Having regard to the manner in which the parties have limited the scope of the controversy between them, it is not necessary to have to trace the antecedent history of the debt, that is whether these debts emanated from Khata accounts and the duration of such Khata accounts.

(3.) From what has been said above, it is clear that the question which falls to be. considered in this appeal is a legal one. We may, therefore, refer to the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant. Mr. Jaleel Ahmed for the appellant, in the main, contended that as the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act is a self-contained Act it has its own provisions pertaining to limitation of time as it prescribes periods of limittations in respect of the applications and proceedings contemplated under its provi" sions, and that the law of limitation as contained in the Indian Act is inapplicable, so much so, rights to debts in regard to which remedies may be time-barred under the Indian Limitation Act could still be recognized by the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board. In order to sustain this contention, several lines of argument are attempted by the learned counsel for the appellant. It would be convenient, therefore, to have to deal with each of them to find out whether the result which the learned counsel seeks to establish follow necessarily from those points.