PALLA PATTABHIRAMAYYA Vs. VELAGA NARAYANA RAO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted on the foot of a promissory note dated 26-12-1949 executed in favour of Palla Kundaraju, the father of the appellants 1 to 5 and the husband of the 6th appellant. The suit was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge on several grounds. But in our opinion, it is sufficient to deal with two of them because if the view of the lower court on either of them is right, this appeal must fail. Both the points arise from the fact that this suit which was instituted on 30-11-1954 is obviously barred by limitation. The contention on behalf of the plaintiffs is that if the time which was occupied in certain proceedings which were taken by Kundaraju before a French Court at Yanam on the basis of the suit promissory note were excluded under Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, then the suit would be in time. The respondent contends that that section does not apply to the facts of this case for two reasons; Firstly, because the said proceedings were pending not in a Court in India to which only Section 14 must be held to refer but in a foreign territory; (Yanam was at the material time part of French India); secondly, because even assuming that the word Court in Section 14 would include a foreign court, the litigation which was launched by Kundaraju before the French Court was disposed of by that Court on the merits and not on the ground that the court was unable to entertain it from defect of jurisdiction or a cause of like nature.

(2.) We shall first consider the question as to whether the word "Court" occurring in Section 14 could be interpreted so as to comprehend a foreign Court. A single judge of the Madras High Court who had to deal with the question as early as in 1880 took the view that there was nothing in the language of Section 14 which rendered it inapplicable to proceedings instituted in a foreign Court (Vide Parry and Co. v. Appasami Pillai, ILR 2 Mad 407).His decision however was reversed on appeal on another point and the Judges in appeal made it clear that they were not to be understood as expressing any opinion whether Section 14 allowed the deduction of the period occupied by a litigation in a foreign court. The question does not appear to have come up for consideration again before that Court; but the Bombay High Court had to consider it in 1910 in Chanmalapa Chenbasapa v. Abdul Vahab, ILR 35 Bom 139 at p. 142. A divisional Bench of that Court (consisting of Chandavarkar and Heaton JJ.) ruled that "the word Court in Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act means a Court in British India, and not a Court in a Native State of India". Chandavarkar J. who spoke for the Bench reasoned thus; "All legislation is primarily territorial, and a limit must be placed upon the general sense of a word used in a statute with reference to that principle of law, unless there is something in the language of object of the statute which compels the court to interpret the word in its wide sense; Cooke v. Charles A. Vogeler Co. 1901 A. C. 102. As was said by this Court in Shidlingappa v. Karibasapa, ILR 11 Bom 599 at p. 601 "the words of a statute, though to be given their grammatical sense are to be construed also with reference to the general purposes of the statute. "Following that canon of construction, our Court field in Queen Empress v. Bapuju Dayaram, ILR 10 Bom 288, that the words any Court in Section 258 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882, meant only "any Civil Court". Turning now to the Limitation Act, its preamble shows that the "courts" to which it, applies are Courts in British India, not foreign Courts. The word must be read in that restricted sense, or else the absurdity would follow that the Legislature intended to provide a "law relating to the limitation of suits, appeals, and certain applications" for Court outside its jurisdiction. And if that is the restricted meaning of the word as used in the preamble, the same meaning must be attached to the word where it occurs in the enacting portions of the Act, unless the enactment is itself so clear and unambiguous as to show that the legislature intended a departure from that meaning in the case of any particular section of the Act. Neither expressly nor by necessary implication has the Legislature made any such purpose apparent in the Limitation Act. The implication is rather the other way". The learned Judge then observed that the word "Court" in Section 14 must have the same meaning in the Limitation Act as in the Civil Procedure Code because both the Acts are in pare material and proceeded to say: "The Code does not define the word "Court" and that for the obvious reason that it applies primarily to the Courts on whom the Code is binding. But it defines "a foreign Court", and wherever it intended that any section of the Code should apply to any judgment or proceeding of that Court, it has said so in distinct terms, as, for instance, in Sections 13 and 14".

(3.) With respect, we find ourselves in complete agreement with this reasoning of the learned Judge. This view has been adopted and followed in Rajanna v. Narayan, AIR 1923 Nag 321 and approved by the High Court of Lahore in Hari Singh v. Muhammad Said, ILR 8 Lah 54: (AIR 1927 Lah 200). It was treated as well settled in a subsequent decision of the Bombay High Court in Ratanchand Bhalchand v. Chandulal J. Doshi, (AIR 1934 Bom 113 (2) and a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Mayadas Bhagat v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., Ltd. ILR (1937) 1 Cal 541 also adopted it later.