KOMMISETTI SATYANARAYANA Vs. IMMADASETTI VENKATASUBBIAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a revision petition filed at the instance of the landlord and arises out of R.C. No. 19 of 1956 filed before the Rent Controller, Guntur, for eviction of the respondent. When notice was taken of the eviction petition, it is said that the respondent refused to receive the same. Accordingly, a copy of the notice was affixed to the house in which the respondent was residing and the duplicate 'notice was returned to the Controller. It must be noted that the copy of the notice which was returned to the Controller was not signed by the amin or the process-server who purported to serve the notice of the eviction petition. When the matter same up for enquiry on 16th February, 1956, an order for eviction was passed. Pursuant thereto proceedings to evict the respondent were launched, and when the respondent came to know of the execution petition, he filed I.A. No. 18 of 1956 before the Controller for setting aside the ex parte order of eviction. This application was filed on 12th June, 1956. The application was ordered by the Controller. This order was set aside on appeal by the Subordinate Judge, Guntur. On a revision petiion preferred to the District Judge, Guntur, he restored the order of the Controller setting aside the ex parte order of eviction. It is against this order in revision by the District Judge that the landlord has preferred the present Civil Revision Petition under section 115, Civil Procedure Code.

(2.) It is contended by the counsel for the petitioner that the petition to restore the ex parte order of eviction has been filed beyond the period prescribed by the Rules. The relevant rule of the Rules framed under G.O. No. 1764/Pub., dated 28th June, 1951, under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, so far as is relevant, is as follows :-

(3.) The sub-rule (3) quoted above is similar to the provisions of Article 164 of the Limitation Act under which the defendant can apply for setting aside an ex parte decree within thirty days from the date of the decree or where the summons is not duly served within thirty days from the date of his knowledge of the decree. No doubt, though sub-rule (3) of rule 9 is modelled upon Article 164 of the Limitation Act and the provisions of Order 9, rule 13, Civil Procedure Code, it has been defectively framed. Reading the rule strictly, even in a case where an ex parte order has been passed by the Controller when the summons has not been duly served, the respondent has to apply within thirty days from the date of the pronouncement of the order in open Court. If the summons has not been duly served, it is incomprehensible how the respondent in an application before the Controller can apply to him within thirty days from the date of the pronouncement of the order in open Court. It is not known how such a respondent can have knowledge of the fact that the order has at all been passed by the Controller and if so on what date. It is therefore necessary to give a reasonable interpretation to the rules, and see whether the limitation of the period of thirty days from the date of the pronouncement of the order in open Court can be applied in a case where there has been no due service. In this connection, sub-rule (8) of rule 24 may also be noticed. It is in these terms :-