(1.) The plaintiffs in the unnumbered suit S. No. 357 are the creditors of the 2nd defendant in the suit. The 1st defendant is his wife. It would appear that the second defendant and his late father had executed a settlement deed, dated 9th May, 1951, in respect of their properties worth about Rs. 30,000 in favour of the 1st defendant (the wife of the 2nd defendant). At the time when the settlement deed was executed the 2nd defendant and his father were members of a joint family. The face value of the said settlement deed was Rs. 30,000. It is the case of the creditors, the plaintiffs in this suit, that the said deed was brought into existence to defeat and delay the creditors, to wit, the plaintiffs in the suit. They, therefore, sought the relief that the settlement deed, dated 9th May, 1951, executed by the 2nd defendant and his late father in favour of the 1st defendant be declared to be not valid and binding on the creditors of the 2nd defendant, viz., the plaintiffs. They valued the suit for purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction at Rs. 5,100 under section 24(d) of the Andhra Court-Fees Act. So computed, they paid a Court-fee of Rs. 420.
(2.) The District Judge was of the view that the plaintiffs have not given any data for their valuing the subject-matter of the suit at Rs. 5,100, that the property covered by the se'tlement deed is worth more than Rs. 30,000 as averred in the plaint and that, therefore, the Court-fee is payable on that Rs. 30,000. The plaintiffs were called upon to pay the deficit Court-fee. It is this order that is assailed in revision. Sri Ramanujachari, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, submits that in effect the learned District Judge had adopted the valuation indicated in section 37 of the Andhra .Court-Fees Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which is per se unsustainable. Section 37 provides for the Court-fee payable in respect of suits for cancellation of decrees or documents. His argument essentially is that the plaintiffscreditors cannot possibly ask for a cancellation of the alleged settlement deed to which they were not parties, that the relief prayed for by them cannot be equated to the relief of cancellation of the document and that section 37 of the Act cannot come into play either by itself or on analogy.
(3.) He seeks support for his argument from a decision of the Madras High Court in Vellayya Konar and another v. Ramaswami Konar and another, 1939 2 M.L.J. 400 : A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 894. The learned Judge considered therein the nature of the relief which would accrue to the plaintiff in a suit contemplated under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act and the relevant provisions of the Madras Court-Fees Act bearing thereon. The reasoning of the learned Judge occurring at page 689 may be usefully set out in this context :-