KHAJA FIAZUDDIN Vs. STATE OF HYDERABAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) An application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed on behalf of Khaja Fiazuddin, against the judgment of this Court, dated 2Oth August, 1959. A preliminary objection is raised on behalf of the State of Hyderabad (now Andhra Pradesh) through the Collector, Land Acquisiton, Hyderabad District, that no appeal would lie to the Supreme Court as against the judgment and decree of this Court in a case arising under the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

(2.) It is contended on behalf of the State that there is no provision in the Act providing for an appeal against the judgment and decree of this Court. The further argument is that the judgment of this Court could not be regarded as a judgment, decree or a final order, so as to come within the ambit of Article 133 of the Constitution.

(3.) It is necessary to refer to some provisions of the Act which are material for the purposes of the determination of the question now argued. Under the Act, after the preliminary procedure for publication of the notification for acquisiton of land for public purposes is gone through, the Talukdar or the Collector gives his award after enquiring into the objections and the relative interests of the parties appearing before him. After the award is given, provision is made for the matter being refer red to the Court under section 14 of the Act, corresponding to section 18 of the Indian Act. The Court then makes an enquiry and gives its award. The aggrieved party is given a right of appeal against the judgment and decree of the Court under section 43. An appeal is provided in the Act to the High Court against the decision of the Court. The position, therefore, is that section 43 provided for an appeal against an award of the Court. Against the judgment and decree of the High Court there lay an appeal to the Judicial Committee (now extinct). Under section 4 of the Judicial Committee Regulation, an appeal lay to the Judicial Committee against every judgment, decree or final order of the High Court passed in its revisional or appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, a person aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the High Court could file an appeal before the Judicial Committee, provided the case satisfied the requirements of section 4 of the Judicial Committee Regulation. The Judicial Committee which was functioning in the State as the Privy Council, recommending to H.E.H. the Nizam the allowing or dismissal of an appeal decided by it, ceased to exist after the coming into force of the Constitution, as under Article 374, sub-article (4) of the Constitution, on and from the commencement of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of this body ceased and all appeals and proceedings before this body on the date of the commencement of the Constitution were transferred to and were to be disposed of by the Supreme Court. In so far as the case before us is concerned, there was no appeal pending before the Judicial Committee on the date of the commencement of the Constitution. Therefore, the question that we have to determine is where the Judicial Committee had ceased to function and there was no appeal pending before it on the date of the commencement of the Constitution, does the Act provide for an appeal ? Obviously, any appeal to the Supreme Court would be governed by Article 133 of the Constitution. Article 133 confers a right of appeal to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order of the High Court.