MOHAMMED BAQUAR HUSSAIN QURESHI Vs. STATE OF HYDERABAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application for transfer of a case before the Special Judge at Warangal which is now reserved for judgment. Two points arise for decision. The first is an objection raised by the Government-Advocate and argued by the Advocate. General that this Court has no jurisdiction to transfer cases triable by the Special Judges to another Court. In support of this argument the Advocate-General relied on certain provisions in the Special Tribunal Regulation and also on the latter (later?) Regulation, known a the Special Judges' Regulation issued on 16. 12-1949. The former Regulation contains Section 7 which takes away the power of transfer of oases by this Court. In Section 5, Sub-section (2) of the Special Judges' Regulation, the Chief Minister alone is authorised to transfer oases pending before a Special Judge to another Special Judge. The Advocate-General argues that reading the two sections together the jurisdiction of this Court to transfer oases pending before the Special Judge has been taken away. He further contends that apart from the relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure Code which authorise this Court to transfer cases or revise orders of the lower judiciary there is no inherent jurisdiction in this Court to do so. In support of this contention he relies on the authority of the Federal Court reported in Pashupati Bharti v. Secy. of State A. I. R. (25) 1938 P. C. 1 : 1989 F. 0. R. 13. That decision was given when Section 224, Government of India Act of 1935 was in force. By subs. (2) of the section, appellate or revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the section was negatived. The Federal Court at p. 3 of the report say that though there had been in recent years tentative efforts on the part of one or two High Courts to assert such powers they have now been decisively negatived by Sub-section (2) of Section 224 of the Act of 1936. The power of 'superintendence' contained in that section has been re-enacted in Article 227 of the Indian Constitution, but this article has no qualification similar to Sub-section (2) and is in much wider terms. The word "superintendence" has been given wide meaning by legal authorities. Blackstone in his commentaries at p. 110 says that it is the peculiar business of the Courts of the King's Bench to 'superintend' all inferior tribunals, and therein to enforce the due exercise of those judicial ministerial powers with which. . . . Legislature has invested them and this, not only by restraining their excesses but also by quickening their negligence and obviating their denial of justice. The absence of provisions similar to Sub-section (2) of Section 224, Government of India Act of 1935 and the wider terms contained in Sub-article (1) of Article 227 of the Indian Constitution dearly show that the word "superintendence" now used cannot be confined to mere matters of administrative control, but confers judicial powers also on this Court. If there be laches or denial of justice by any Tribunal, we are of opinion that by exercise of this power of superintendence, we can transfer a case from a Special Judge. The mere existence of provisions in special enactments like the Special Judges' Regulation cannot exclude the jurisdiction of this Court to exercise powers of superintendence over Subordinate Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The words used in this Sub-article are:

(2.) THE next point involved is: Do the allegations contained in the application justify transfer of the case now under judgment? We went carefully through the different allegations of fact contained in the transfer application. We are of opinion that with the exception of the allegation contained in Para,, 16 of the application the other allegations are extremely vague. They are of a general nature and do not furnish particular instances from which this Court could draw its own conclusion as to whether they constitute sufficient and cogent grounds for ordering transfer. There is one particular allegation mentioned in para. 16 of the application, but surprisingly enough the affidavit of the petitioner does not support that allegation. In the absence of any such corroboration by a sworn statement, we are of opinion, that this particular allegation at this stage of the case cannot be regarded as sufficient ground for the transfer of the time. The result is, the application for transfer is rejected, the order of stay passed on 8-5-1950 and extended from time to time is discharged. The trial Judge is to proceed with the case, We wish to emphasise that our decision about the application is confined only to the application for transfer and will in no way affect the view that the appellate Court may take having regard to the facts of the case, when an appeal is filed. We refused the prayer for the summoning, of the record of the case, because we are of opinion that every application for transfer should furnish material particulars regarding the general allegations contained in the application against the judicial authority. Mere conclusions of the applicant unless supported by materials accompanying the appliocation, in our opinion, would carry little weight in persuading this Court to believe the allegations.

(3.) THE application for transfer is refused.