MUSTYALA JAGADESHWAR Vs. MUSTYALA LAXMI BAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These two C.R.Ps. can be disposed of by a common order since they arise out of the same suit. C.R.P.No. 4112 of 99 is directed against the order setting aside the compromise decree dated 7-9-1988 passed in the suit whereas the other C.R.P. is directed against an order impleading the first respondent herein as a party to the suit.

(2.) The first respondent is the mother of respondents 2 to 5. Respondents 2 to 5 filed the suit against the petitioners herein and another for partition of the plaint schedule properties. The suit was filed on 1-9-1988. On 7-9-1988 a compromise was arrived at between the parties. In terms of the said compromise a decree was passed for partition of the suit properties between the plaintiffs and the defendants. The first respondent, who was not a party to the suit, filed I.A.No. 76 of 89 to set aside the compromise decree dated 7-9-1988 claiming that she is entitled to items 17 to 23 of the plaint schedule which are her separate properties and that the compromise decree is collusive and it is not valid and binding on her. She also filed I.A.No. 77 of 89 to implead her as a party to the suit. Respondents 2 to 5, who are the sons of the first respondent, did not oppose the said applications and they remained ex parte. The applications were resisted by the petitioners herein contending that the compromise decree dated 7-9-1988 was a final decree by which the suit was completely disposed of and nothing remained to be done in the suit and as such the two applications filed by the first respondent are not maintainable and that the remedy of the first respondent was only to file a separate suit to agitate her rights if any. It was also contended that all the three widows of Venkatramaiah including the first respondent herein relinquished all their rights in the suit properties and executed documents dated 24-8-1988 and 26-8-1988 (which were marked as Exs. B-1 and B-2) and the first respondent is, therefore, not entitled to claim any rights in the suit properties or question the compromise decree passed in the suit.

(3.) Both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence. The lower Court, by the impugned orders dated 6-8-1999 allowed the applications filed by the first respondent holding that the compromise decree dated 7-9-1988 is only a preliminary decree and as such the suit must be deemed to be pending and the first respondent is, therefore, entitled to come on record and agitate her rights. Accordingly the lower Court set aside the compromise decree and directed both parties to proceed with the suit.