(1.) The petitioner while serving as Conductor in the establishment of the A.P.S.R.T.C. was subjected to disciplinary proceedings on the alleged misconduct committed by him. Those disciplinary proceedings resulted in removal of the petitioner as a disciplinary measure by Office Order dated 08-07-1978. The petitioner-workman instituted I.D.No. 77 of 1986 in the Labour Court, Warangal. The Labour Court passed an award on 02-02-1987 in favour of the petitioner-workman directing reinstatement of the petitioner into service with continuity of service and full back-wages. The validity of the award was assailed before this Court both before the learned single Judge and Division Bench and ultimately the management failed in its attempt and the award passed by the Labour Court, Warangal dated 02-02-1987 has become final. However, while proceedings were pending before this Court, it appears that the petitioner was reinstated into service on 01-12-1987.
(2.) The grievance of the petitioner in the instant writ petition is that after his reinstatement into service, the respondents while fixing his wage have not taken into account the notional increments that would have been earned by the petitioner had he been in actual service during the period between 08-07-1978 i.e., the date on which the petitioner was removed from service as a disciplinary measure and 01-12-1987 i.e., the date on which the petitioner was reinstated into service by virtue of the award made by the Labour Court, Warangal in I.D.No. 77 of 1986 dated 02-02-1987. The point that falls for consideration is well settled by the decision of this Court reported in T. Narayana vs. APSRTC. The view taken by me has been confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court and the Supreme Court.
(3.) However, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-Corporation would contend that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limini on the ground of laches, and elaborating his contention the learned Counsel would contend that though the petitioner was reinstated in the year 1987 and his wage was fixed immediately thereafterwards, the petitioner did not choose to make any grievance in time and, therefore, he is not entitled to the relief at the hands of this Court. It is not that this Court should reject each and every writ application where there is delay on the part of the applicant who moves this Court. It is relevant to note that though the petitioner was reinstated into service on 01-12-1987, the management was fighting the litigation before this Court, both before the learned single Judge and Division Bench assailing the validity of the award made by the Labour Court, Warangal in I.D.No. 77 of 1986 dated 02-02-1987. In this contextual scenario the argument of the learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation has to be viewed. The Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly held and reiterated that Industrial Law is essentially meant to protect the rights of the workmen and sometimes it is called biased Law, biased towards workmen. The technicalities shall not come in the way of enforcing the substantive rights accrued to the workmen under the awards of the Industrial Courts. The learned Standing Counsel has no argument touching merits of the matter. A.P.S.R.T.C. is the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Therefore, its action should be fair, reasonable and inspire confidence. It cannot put forward technicalities to defeat the legitimate rights of the workman. In all fairness, the management should have taken into account the notional increments that would have been earned by the petitioner had he been in service during the period between 08-07-1978 and 01-12-1987, and on that basis the management ought to have determined the wage payable to him on reinstatement as directed by Labour Court, and for no good reason the management denied that relief to the petitioner. In that view of the matter, I am not persuaded not to grant the relief to the petitioner because there is some delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching this Court.