POTLURI RAJESWARA RAO Vs. SYNDICATE BANK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) An interesting question of enforcement of foreign judgment, jurisdiction, involving Private International Law read with Sections 13, 44 and 44-A of the Civil Procedure Code falls for consideration in this Revision Petition. What i$ know as "Private International law" is not a law governing relations between independent States. It is a branch of civil law of the State evolved to do justice between litigating parties in respect of transactions involving a foreign element. Thus private International Law comes into operation whenever the Court is faced with the claim that contains foreign judgment and decree. Instances are not wanting when the Court in one country must take into account the 'rule of law' that exists in another country. This is on the basis of the reciprocating agreement entered into between the two countries for the purpose of enforcing the decree and judgment of another country as if it has been passed and decreed in the country where it is sought to be enforced. The enforcement of such decree must also be in accordance with the law of the land where it is being made 'rule of law'.

(2.) Facts leading to the filing of this revision petition are as set out hereunder:- The petitioner is the judgment-debtor and the respondent is the decreeholder. The respondent is a Nationalized Bank and it has filed O.S. No.6907 of 1984 on the file of the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, London, U.K. for recovery of 4869-60 Pounds. The High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, London, issued Writ of Summons on 18-12-1984. The petitioner received the summons at Algeria on 10-6-1985 and expressed his intention to contest the matter by his endorsement "without prejudice". Ultimately the petitioner did not choose to contest and the petitioner was set ex parte and a default judgment was passed on 6-11-1985. The respondent-decreeholder filed a petition under Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure for transferring the decree passed by the High Court of Justice, Queens Bench Division, London in O.S. No.6907 of 1989 against the petitioner-judgment-debtor in the Subordinate Judge's Court at Gudivada for execution on the ground that United Kingdom is a reciprocating country to India and according to Section 44(a)(ii) of the Code of Civil Procedure the decree may be executed as if it has been passed by the executing Court. The judgment-debtor opposed the execution proceedings i.e., E.A. No.254 of 1992 in O.S. No.6907 of 1984 on the ground that the decree was passed not on merits but due to default and it is not a decree within the meaning of Sec. 13 (a) I and (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was also contended that the judgment- debtor was a resident of Algeria and was never resident of London and that he did not submit himself to the jurisdiction of London Court and hence the decree and judgment passed by the Queen's Bench, London is a nullity and without jurisdiction. The District Court addressed itself to the issue whether the decree is a default decree or it is on merits and if so whether the judgment-debtor submitted himself to the jurisdiction of Courts in London. The District Court allowed the petition holding that the judgment-debtor has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the U.K. Court and the decree is based on merit and allowed the petition. Aggrieved by the order of the District Judge the present revision has been filed.

(3.) Sri P. Raja Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has strenuously contended that the impugned order passed by the Court below is illegal and without jurisdiction. It is his contention that the decree passed by the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench, London is a default decree and no evidence was recorded and hence it is not a judgment on merits and is incapable of execution and is hit by Section 13 (a) and (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is his contention that an ex parte decree of foreign Court is a nullity if the party against whom the decree is passed does not appear and does not take part in the proceedings of the Court. It is his further contention that the petitioner-judgment-debtor never submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Courts in U.K. and that he was residing at Algeria at the relevant time of filing the suit and passing of default decree and as such it cannot be enforced in India.