LAWS(MEGH)-2024-4-2

PRAKASH MOMIN Vs. STATE OF MEGHALAYA

Decided On April 09, 2024
Prakash Momin Appellant
V/S
STATE OF MEGHALAYA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has raised his grievance against the inaction on the part of the respondents, particularly the respondent No.2, to consider his written application seeking reference of the matter pertaining to the acquisition of his land under Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to the Reference Court. 1. The brief fact of the case is that a portion of the petitioner's land situated at Mendipathar, East Garo Hills District (now North Garo Hills District), was acquired by the Government for construction of a new railway line from Dudhnoi to Mendipathar. The acquisition proceeding was initiated by issuance of notification dtd. 24/11/2009 and public notice dtd. 30/11/2009 under Sec. 4 of the Act. In view of the emergency of the project, the provision of Sec. 17 (4) of the Act was invoked and the petitioner was paid the initial compensation of 80 % on 30/8/2011 and the remaining 20 % on 1710-2012. The petitioner received the aforesaid compensation under protest and subsequently by a written application made a request to the respondent No.2 for referring the matter to the Reference Court as the amount of compensation paid was not adequate. Since no action was taken by the respondent No.2, the petitioner having no other option approached this Court for a direction to the respondent to refer the matter to the Reference Court for determination of adequate land compensation.

(2.) Against the claim made in the writ petition, the respondent No.2 and the respondent No.4 filed two separate affidavit-in-opposition. The respondent No.2, the Collector, in his affidavit-in-opposition, apart from refuting the claim of the writ petitioner for enhancement of the amount of compensation, has taken a stand that the application of the petitioner for reference of the matter was not considered as the same was filed on 7/12/2012 beyond the statutory period of 6 (six) weeks from the date of final award on 17/10/2012. Subsequently, by an additional affidavit filed on 28/4/2023, the respondent No.2 stated that the petitioner has received an amount of Rs.17,70,820.00 as land compensation which is reflected in the Award Statement dated 14-112011.

(3.) Mr. T. T. Diengdoh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that though the petitioner has received the final amount of compensation on 17/10/2012, he was not made aware of the date of the award and the contents thereof by the respondents. He submits that the petitioner was not present or represented when the award was made by the Collector and no notice was served on him under Sec. 12 (2) of the Act. He further submits that even the reason for non-consideration of the request of the petitioner for reference of the matter was made known to him only after filing of the affidavit-in-opposition by the respondent No.2. The learned Senior counsel submits that as per the affidavit-in opposition of the respondent No.2, the date of final award is 17/10/2012 whereas the additional affidavit dtd. 28/4/2023 filed by the respondent No.2, in clear contradiction of the affidavit-in-opposition, indicates that the Award Statement was prepared on 14/11/2011. He contends that the date of award cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office, it must involve the consideration of the question as to when it was known to the petitioner. The knowledge of the party affected by the award being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice, the word 'date of award' used in the proviso to Sec. 18(2) of the Act, must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the petitioner or is known by him. He submits that in absence of any such proof showing that the petitioner had the knowledge of the date of award, the non-consideration of the application of the petitioner for reference by the respondent No.2 on the ground of delay is not tenable in the eye of law. He further contends that the date of receipt of compensation has no bearing in determination of date of award and hence, it is a fit case where a direction be issued to the respondent No.2 to refer the matter to the Reference Court for determination of amount of adequate compensation to the petitioner. In support of his argument, the learned Senior counsel places reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court reported in (2012) 5 SCC 250, Premji Nathu Vs. State of Gujarat and Anr. (paras 12 - 16), (2009) 16 SCC 1, Steel Authority of India Limited Vs. Sutni Sangam and Others. (Paras 40 - 43) and (2018) 8 SCC 266, Vijay Mahadeorao Kubade Vs. State of Maharashtra Through the Collector (paras 9 and 11).