MINEN MARAK Vs. GARI HILLS AUTONOMOUS DIST. COUNCIL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present Writ Appeal has been preferred, challenging the order of the learned Single Judge dtd. 8/5/2023 passed in WP(C) No.377 of 2019, in and by which, the Writ Petition filed by the Writ Petitioner / R4 herein was allowed.

(2.) The case put forth by the Writ Petitioner / R4 herein before the Writ Court was that as against the order dtd. 13/9/2018 passed by the Executive Member/R3, dismissing the application as barred by the principle of res judicata, R4 in the Writ Petition had preferred an appeal in GHADC.Rev/Appeal No.9 of A/C of 2018 before R2, which was allowed on 5/7/2019, remanding back the case to the Executive Member with a direction to record the statement and evidences of the witnesses of both parties and thereafter, to transmit the record to the Court of the Chief Executive Member for final adjudication and determination of the issues in controversy between the parties. Aggrieved by the order dtd. 5/7/2019, the Writ Petitioner/R4 herein has approached the learned Single Judge by filing the Writ Petition, the order of which is impugned in the Writ Appeal, inasmuch as learned Single Judge has allowed the Writ Petition on 8/5/2023 and set aside the order dtd. 5/7/2019. Against the said order, the present Writ Appeal has been preferred.

(3.) The Writ Petitioner/R4 herein vehemently contended that R3, being a custodian of the Nokmaship, the right and ownership of the office of the Nokma of Marakapara Akhing had already been merged with the Kharijor Akhing since 1935 and the predecessor of the writ petitioner had been made as a Nokma of the Akhing for several decades. It was further contended that neither the appellants 1 to 3 herein nor their predecessors in interest had made any claim or objection at any point of time. It was only in the year 2005, that too, after a lapse of many decades, the 1st Appellant herein moved a petition before the respondent No.2, seeking for an order of appointment of the Appellants 2 and 3 as Nokma of the Marakapara Akhing II-15 (A), which is clearly barred by the principle of estoppel, acquiescence and waiver and as such, the claim of the appellant 1 ought not to have been entertained at all.