KALPANA Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner, Kalpana d/o Nilaram Harinkhede (minor girl), who is a victim of assault and use of criminal force with intention to outrage her modesty at the hands of respondent No. 2, Moreshwar s/o Ghabilal Rahandale, and respondent No. 3, Keshaw s/o Dimodhar Patle, has approached this Court by invoking its jurisdiction under sections (sic Articles) 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India read with section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, impugning the discharge of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 from having committed offence under section 354 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gondia, in Criminal Case No. 1065 of 1995, State v. Moreshwar Rahangdale and another, on 7-1-1998, on the ground that the trial of the respondents/accused was pending in the said Court for more than two years, without any fault on their part, and as the trial has not commenced, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in ("common Cause" a Registered Society-vs-Union of India), Writ Petition No. 1128/86 decided on 1-5-1996, reported in 1996 (4) Bom. C. R. 519 : 1997 Bom. C. R. (Cri) 318 : J. T. 1996 (4) S. C. 701 : 1996 (4) S. C. C. 33, discharged the respondents/accused.

(2.) IT was contended by the petitioner that the respondents accused are discharged of the offence under section 354 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, in spite of their being sufficient evidence on record, which would have resulted in their conviction, and the trial Court having misinterpreted the judgment of the Apex Court, has wrongly given them the benefit of discharge. It was contended that due to the incident, the petitioner had to suffer pain, humiliation and mental torture and, therefore, the impugned order discharging the respondents accused deserves to be quashed and set aside and they should be dealt in accordance with law.

(3.) WHEN the criminal writ petition came up for hearing, the Counsel for the petitioner and the respondents /accused were not present. Therefore, this Court heard the learned A. P. P. and disposed of the writ petition by its order dated 1st December, 1998, holding that the order of the Magistrate cannot be faulted with, as it was passed in view of the directions given by the Apex Court in the "common Cause" judgment and except for observing that the category in which the case ought to have been considered would be 2 (a) and 2 (b ). While concluding the order, this Court did observe that "it is unfortunate that the petitioner had to suffer the humiliation at the hands of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, but the trial Court had no option but to discharge the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and having done so in accordance with the directions of the Apex Court, it does not call for any interference. The petition stands dismissed. Rule stands discharged. "