VIDYADHAR H VARMA Vs. R H MENDONCA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Petitioner has approached this court by way of this writ petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus challenging the detention of his son Shri. Mahesh Vidyadhar Varma as a "dangerous person" as per the order of detention dated 23rd March, 1999 passed by 1st respondent under Sub-Section (1) of Section (3) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred as the said Act" ). Along with the said order, the detenu was served grounds of detention which was also dated 23-3-1999. THE order of detention and the grounds of detention have been annexed in the writ petition as Annexure A and C, respectively.

(2.) THIS writ Petition was heard by us partly on 21-7-1999. On that day, Mr. R. S. Chitnis, learned counsel for the Petitioner, tried to impress upon us that the petition can be allowed only on t he ground of unexplained delay in issuing the detention order after the last prejudicial activities. According to the counsel, there was a delay of 1. 1/2 months which was not explained. But the learned A. P. P. Mr. S. G. Deshmukh, met this argument by saying that though the delay was not explained in required details, connected files contained the explanation and on that ground he prays for some time to file the additional reply to which the Counsel for the Petitioner strenuously opposed. He contended that the defect in the reply affidavit cannot be allowed to be cured. However, after perusing the file, we were satisfied that the files contain necessary details for explaining the delay and therefore, in the interest of justice, we granted time to the learned A. P. P. for filing an additional reply to the 1st respondent till 4-8-1999, by an order dated 21-7-1999. When the writ petition was taken up for hearing on 4-8-1999, the learned counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. Chitnis did not argue the point of delay but argued the case on some other points. But we feel it is not necessary to advert to all those points in this judgment because this case can be disposed of on a contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner which is discussed in detail hereinafter below.

(3.) THE learned Counsel contended that the aforesaid materials would afford no material at all to arrive at a subjective satisfaction to the Detaining Authority to invoke Section 3 (1) of the said Act. In these premises, the learned counsel for the Petitioner Mr. Chitnis has formulated following points : 1. In the light of the allegations contained in the aforesaid C. R. and in camera statements, the petitioner cannot be fit in the definition of "dangerous person" as defined under section 2 (b-i) which reads as under : " dangerous person" means a person, who either by himself or as a member or a leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets of the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959".