(1.) THE respondent was involved in C. R. No. 32 of 98 which was registered against him by the Shani Peth Police Station, Jalgaon for the offence punishable under section 407 and 420 of I. P. C. The respondent then moved an application under section 438 of Cr. P. C. for anticipatory bail. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jalgaon by his order dated 13-8-1998 allowed that application and directed that in the event of his arrest, in connection with C. R. No. 32 of 98, the respondent be released on his furnishing P. R. bond of Rs. 3,000/- with a surety in the like amount. This order is challenged by the petitioner State in this revision application filed under section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(2.) HEARD Shri Quazi, learned A. P. P. for the petitioner State and Shri Raghuwanshi, learned Advocate for the respondent. Shri Raghuwanshi has in the first instance, raised a basic objection to the maintainability of the revision application. According to him, no revision application lies against an order of grant of bail. Shri Raghuwanshi further contended that the proper remedy for the petitioner State would be to move an application under section 439 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for cancellation of bail. Shri Quazi, the learned A. P. P on the other hand, submitted that the revision application is very much maintainable in view of the provisions of section 397 of Code of Criminal Procedure since the correctness, legality and propriety of the impugned order is challenged.
(3.) IT is material to note that under sub-section (2) of section 397 of the Code, powers of revision cannot be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or in other proceedings. According to Shri Raghuwanshi, the impugned order is of interlocutory nature and as such, the bar of section 397 (2) becomes operative. In support of his submission, Shri Raghuwanshi has relied upon several decisions. The first of which is (Dhola v. State) 1975 Cri. L. J. 1274 wherein the Rajasthan High Court held that the order regarding grant or refusal of bail application is essentially an interlocutory order as it enlarges the accused in non-bailable cases to defend himself adequately and thereby assist the cause of justice. It was further observed that such an order is based on some intermediate stage between commencement and end of criminal cases and it does not determine the innocence or guilt of the accused. It was, therefore, held that the revision does not lie against such an order.