LAWS(BOM)-1989-6-42

SHIVDAYAL BIHARILAL GUPTA Vs. MOHANLAL VANJRAJ SHAH

Decided On June 20, 1989
Shivdayal Biharilal Gupta Appellant
V/S
Mohanlal Vanjraj Shah Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) MOHANLAL Shivdayal & Company, a partnership concern was initially owner of house No. 21 situated at Ghorpuri Bazar, Pune and one room admeasuring 120 sq. feet on the ground floor of this house was let out to the respondent No. 1. Mohanlal and Shivdayal were two partners of the partnership firm. The partnership firm had instituted Suit No. 3602 of 1964 in the Court of Small Causes at Pune for recovery of possession of the room from the respondent on the ground of bonafide personal requirement. The suit was dismissed and order of dismissal was upheld the right upto High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1532 of 1967 which was disposed of on April 15, 1971.

(2.) THE partnership was dissolved in the year 1975 and the suit house came to the share of Shivdayal. Both Mohanlal and Shivdayal instituted Suit No. 3147 of 1978 in the Court of 4th Additional Judge, Small Causes Court, Pune against the respondent for recovery of possession on the ground that the premises are required reasonably and bonafide for occupation of plaintiff No. 2 Shivdayal. The landlords also claimed that the tenant had acquired suitable alternate accommodation in house No. 10 and is no longer in need of suit room. The trial Court after recording evidence came to the conclusion that the landlords established requirement of Shiv Dayal and also established that greater hardship would be caused to the landlords by refusing decree than to the tenant by passing it. The trial Court also held that the tenant had acquired suitable alternate accommodation in house No. 10 which was purchased by the tenant in the year 1980 for consideration of Rs. 24,000/-. The decree passed by the trial Court was reversed in appeal by District Court by judgment dated December 10, 1986. The lower Appellate Court held that the requirement of landlords was not established and in any event greater hardship would be caused to the tenant than to the landlords. The appellate Court also held against the landlords on the issue of acquisition of alternate suitable accommodation. The judgment of the lower Appellate Court is under challenge in this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

(3.) SHRI Abhyankar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant, submitted that the partnership firm had earlier filed suit on the ground of requirement in the year 1964 and that Suit No. 3602 of 1964 was dismissed on the ground that just prior to institution of the suit one room had fallen vacant in House No. 21 and was let out by the landlords. Shri Abhyankar urged that there are hardly any changes in the requirement of the landlords after institution of the suit in the year 1964. The submission cannot be accepted, because after passage of almost 15 years it is futile to suggest that circumstances have not changed. In the first instance the plaintiff's sons are married and have children. Secondly, the widowed daughter of the plaintiff has returned back to her parents' house along with her children. These facts clearly deem that the landlord is entitled to more accommodation than what is available to him. The mere fact that prior to the year 1964 one room was let out by the landlord in house No. 21 is not enough to conclude that the requirement of the landlord is not genuine. Shri Abhayankar also submitted that in house No. 21 there is godown on the ground floor and there is also a room and the same could be used by the landlord for his additional requirement. The submission cannot be accepted, because that trial Judge very rightly pointed out that the godown is not meant for residential accommodation and one room and is unfit for human habitation. In my judgment on these facts and circumstances it is impossible even to suggest that the requirement of the landlord is neither genuine nor reasonable. The finding recorded by the trial Court should not have been disturbed by the lower appellate Court.