EKNATH JHARIBA MASURKAR Vs. KOHINOOR MILLS COMPANY LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A simple question of law that has been canvassed in this writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution is whether a Labour Court has the power to pass a conditional order under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ).

(2.) THE petitioner-workman made an application before the Second Labour Court at Bombay under Section 33-C (2) of the Act that a sum of Rs. 8,280/- was due and payable to him by the first respondent-employer. The said application was allowed by the learned Labour Judge by his judgment and order dated April 2, 1982 by which the first respondent was directed to pay the balance amount of Rs. 1,656/- out of the amount of Rs. 8,280/- to the petitioner but on condition that he vacated the Company's premises which he was occupying during the course of his employment with the first respondent. The petitioner challenges that part of the order whereby the learned Labour Judge put a condition on him that he would get the amount due to him only on his vacating the Company's premises. Mr. Patel, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner-workman, submit that while disposing of an application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act, the Labour Court cannot create a term of condition of service. In the submission of Mr. Patel, the powers vested in the Labour court under Section 33-C (2) of the Act are limited to either granting or rejecting the application of the payment of money due to the workman and cannot pass a conditional order that the payment would be made only if one or more conditions are satisfied. Mrs. Naphade, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the first respondent, urges that there was an oral agreement between the Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh, representing the petitioner-workman among others, and the Millowners' Association that the amount due to the petitioner and for that reason of others would be payable only on vacating the Company's premises. In the submission of Mrs. Naphade, therefore, the learned Labour Judge was right in putting a condition on the petitioner that he would be entitled to get the balance amount of money due to him provided he vacated the company's premises.

(3.) I am not able to persuade myself to agree with the submission made by Mrs. Naphade for the simple reason that under Section 33-C (2) of the Act, a Labour Court does not get a power to pass a conditional order. An application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act is made by a workman who is entitled to receives from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if he succeeds in such an application the only option left to the labour Court is to pass an order in his favour directing the employer to pay the money due to the workman. While exercising such jurisdictions which are in the nature of executory powers vested in the Labour Court, a Labour Judge cannot put a condition on a workman that he would get amount due to him provided he satisfied one or the other condition. It is none of the duty of the Labour Judge to raise such a condition on a workman which would indirectly amount to pressurising the workman to vacate the premises. If the workman really commits a breach of an agreement or an understanding there may be other remedies available to the employer to get him evicted from such premises and when such proceedings are taken by the employer the workman may have a defence which he would be deprived of if such a conditional order as the one passed by the Labour Judge in our case is passed. For all that we know that the employer in our case has a case to take suitable steps in an appropriate Court of Law to evict the petitioner - workman out of the Company's premises, but that does not entitle a Labour Judge while exercising powers under Section 33-C (2) of the Act to evict a workman by this indirect method. That would amount to evicting the workman without he being properly heard in the matter of his defence, if any, in not being evicted from the Company's premises. In this view of the matter, I find error apparent on the face of the record in the learned Labour Judge making a direction that the balance of the amount would be paid to the petitioner-workman only after he vacates the Company's premises. So much of his order is, therefore, not in accordance with law and the same will have to be quashed and set aside.