(1.) THE petitioner is the wife of the Peter Camile D'costa, who has been detained under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Ordinance, 1988. By this Writ Petition, she challenges the Order of Detention dated 29th August, 1988, passed by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India against her husband under Section 3 (1) of the aforesaid Act, purportedly with a view to preventing him from engaging in the transportation, concealment and conspiring in the export from India of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, as well as the Declaration No. 36/88 made on 3rd October, 1988, by the Additional Secretary to the Government of India under Section 10 (1) of the same Act.
(2.) THE facts that led to the issuance of the aforesaid Order of Detention and Declaration are that on September 5, 1987, the officers of the Rummeging Section of Customs Preventive Collectorate, Bombay boarded vessel "m. V. Vishva Nandini" which was berthed at 12-A Indira Dock. On search conducted in the Cabin No. 167 which was, at the relevant time, occupied by the detenue and one Julie Cerreia, some drugs had been found. Further search was conducted in several other rooms of the vessel, and in all, 313 packets, each of them containing 1,000 Mandrex tablets, worth Rs. 13,000/-, had been found, as well as, 5 packets of brown sugar, weighing 8 Kgs. and worth about Rs. 8,00,000/ -. In addition, foreign, currency equivalent to Rs. 3,430/- was also found. All these articles, that is Mandrex tablets, brown sugar and foreign currency, were seized by the Customs Authorities. Thereafter, investigation was made and the Customs Authorities were satisfied that the detenu was involved in activities of transporting the aforesaid drugs outside India. Hence, the impugned Detention Order and the Declaration were made.
(3.) THE petitioner challenges the aforesaid Detention Order and Declaration on several grounds. However, at the time of the hearing, Mr. Rebello, the learned counsel appearing for her, confined the challenge to only one ground. He, indeed, submitted that, although in the grounds of detention a reference is made to the fact that the petitioner has been enlarged on bail, the fact remains that the application for bail and the order passed therein by the concerned Judge were not placed before the Detaining Authority. According to the learned counsel, the said bail application and Order are vital documents which, if placed before the Detaining Authority, would have definitely influenced it in the formation of the subjective satisfaction. The Detention Order is, therefore, vitiated and liable to be quashed and set aside. Reliance was placed in support of the above submission, in the decision of the Division Bench of this Court (Puranik and Guttal, JJ.) in Criminal Writ Petn. No. 1085 of 1988, Roven T. D'cruz v. The Union of India a copy of which was placed before us.