LAWS(BOM)-1979-4-8

SAILESH PRANBHYDAS MEHTA Vs. DILIP HARILAL MEHTA

Decided On April 24, 1979
SAILESH PRANBHYDAS MEHTA Appellant
V/S
DILIP HARILAL MEHTA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are two revision applications arising out of the same order, namely, the order dated 25th and 26th April, 1978, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, in Criminal Application No. 25 of 1978. Revision Application No. 451 of 1978 is filed by the original complainant and Revision Application No. 1477 of 1978 is filed by the original accused. Both the said applications are being disposed of by this common judgment.

(2.) The complainant filed a criminal case being Case No. 32/W of 1976 in the Metropolitan Magistrate, 14th Court, at Girgaum, against the accused for the offence under section 497 of the Indian Penal Code. According to this complaint, the accused who is the first cousin of the complainants father, had committed adultery during the years 1974 and 1975 within the meaning of the said section, with his wife Anjali. In the complaint, he gave a list of witnesses which included two persons, one was his sister Bakula and the other was Inspector of Police, Gamdevi Police Station, Bombay.

(3.) At the trial, before framing the charge the learned Magistrate took evidence under section 244 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as the said Code), and thereafter by his order, dated the 20th of January, 1978, framed a charge against the accused for the offence under section 497 of the Indian Penal Code. This order framing the charge was challenged by the accused by Revision Application No. 25 of 1978, under section 497 of the said Code before the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, and the learned Judge by his impugned order held that there was no legal evidence before the learned Magistrate to frame the charge in question and quashed the said charge. However, instead of discharging the accused, the learned Judge remanded the matter to the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for either trying it by himself or assigning it for trial to any other Metropolitan Magistrate for fresh trial, in support of this part of the order, namely, the remand, he stated that if after setting aside the order framing the charge he discharged the accused, the complainant might file a complaint and the proceedings might have to continue afresh. In his opinion, therefore, to save the time and energy of the parties concerned, the present proceedings should be continued and the complainant should be given an opportunity to lead such evidence as he choose to do. He has further observed that if such evidence is led, it might be that some of the grounds on which the evidence, which he had held inadmissible at that stage, might no more continue to be inadmissible and might be admitted properly. It is aggrieved by the first part of the order that the accused has preferred his revision application, and the other revision application filed by the accused is directed against the said later part of the order.