NATHURAM WELJIBHAI VYAS Vs. LAXMIBAI LUNKARANJI CHANDAK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondent claiming to be the owner of the house occupied by the petitioner and claiming that the petitioner was occupying the said house as a tenant filed an application before the Rent Controller, Wardha, for permission to terminate the tenancy of the petitioner under clause 13(3)(ii) and clause 13 (3)(vi) of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter referred as "the Rent Control Order"). In that proceedings, the petitioner denied that the respondent was the owner of the house, as also that the petitioner was occupying the same as a tenant; on the contrary the petitioner contended that he was occupying the house as an owner, he and his father having prescribed title to the suit house by their adverse possession. The existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties were thus alleged by the respondent, but was denied by the petitioner, and, naturally, its became an issue in the proceedings. The respondent filed an application before the Rent Controller for summoning the ITO together with the returns filed by the petitioner, it seems, with the idea of proving from those returns that certain payments as rent for the suit house were shown by the petitioner in those returns. The petitioner filed an objection to the production of these documents and to the examination of the ITO contending that the returns, documents and statements made and filed by an assessee before the ITO were strictly confidential documents and they could not be made use of in a court unless permitted by the I.T. Act. It was contended that under sec. 138 of the I.T. Act, 1961, the disclosure of information made to the ITO is prohibited, and such a disclosure can be made only in cases governed by sec. 138 of the Act and, therefore the non-applicant tenant, i.e., the present petitioner, was objecting to the production of the documents by the ITO. The rights granted by s. 138 of the I.T. Act had to be protected and respected by the court, the petitioner contends that this objection of the petitioner was orally rejected by the Rent Controller; he did not pass any written orders; the petitioner then applied for stay of proceedings to enable the petitioner to approach this court, but the Rent Controller also orally rejected that application of the petitioner. The Rent Controller, then issued a summons to the ITO, for appearing as a witness, and also directed him to produce the documents. By this writ petition under art. 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has challenged this act of the Rent Controller. Wardha, and he has prayed of the issues of a writ of mandamus, or any other proper writ or direction quashing the oral order passed by the Rent Controller rejecting the petitioner's objection, and for issue of a direction to the Rent Controller. Not to issue any summons to the ITO, Wardha, either for the production of document or for examining him as a witness.

(2.) It would seem that a prayer for the issue of a writ of prohibition or a writ of certiorari would have been more appropriate in the circumstances, the Rent Controller, Wardha, however, has not been impleaded as a party to this proceeding.

(3.) In his arguments Mr. Madkholkar for the petitioner preferred to take up first the contention that the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to issue a summons to a witness either for appearance before him as a witness, or to produce any document before the Rent Controller. Mr.Madkholkar contended that the Rent Controller is not a "court". The is only a Tribunal created under a subordinate legislation for a particular purpose, and as such his substantive or procedural powers are governed by the legislation creating that Tribunal. It was pointed out that the Rent Control Order was made by the Provincial Govt. of the then Central Provinces and Berar in exercise of the powers conferred on the Provincial Govt. under sec. 2 of the C.P. and Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The Act itself was a transitory provision, (though it has since been continued till now), as is apparent from sec. 1(3) of the Act which enacts :