FATIMABAI ABDULLA KASKAR Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision application by the original accused No. 1 Fatimabai Abdulla Kaskar is directed against the order of her conviction and sentence dated 14th August 1978 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, in Criminal Appeal No. 489 of 1976 under the provisions of sections 3 [1], 4 [1] and 5 [1] of the Suppreesion of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956.

(2.) It is, indeed, surprising to find both the Courts below convicting the present accused No. 1 for the offences under the sections mentioned herein above Going through the judgments of both the Courts below as also the record of the case, I find no evidence at all against the present accused No. 1. On the contrary, such evidence as is on the record clearly shows that she was an aged woman suffering from a fracture and lying on a bed In separate bedroom with plaster. It is extremely difficult to even gauge as to on what particular ground this accused was convicted except that the property in question stood in her name. Merely because a property stands in the name of a particular person, that person cannot by that simple fact be held to be guilty of an offence under section 3 [1] and 5 [1] of the aforesaid Act.

(3.) The prosecution in this case has not alleged a single circumstance against this accused, There is not a little of evidence to show thataccused has been keeping or managing or acts or assists in the keeping or management of a brothel within the meaning of section 3 [1] of the Act, There is also not a little of evidence on the record to show that this accused knowingly lived wholly or in part on the earnings prositution within the meaning of section 4 [1] of the Act nor any title of evidence that this accused has been in any way connected with any of the acts mentioned in clause (a) to (d) of sub section 1 of section 5 of the said Act. In all these circumstances, the conclusion drawn by the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the very presence of this accused in the premises "---clearly establishes that she had definite knowledge that the business of prostitution was being carried on by her husband accused No. 2" cannot be accepted. Mere innocuous and helpless presence and merely because a property stands in the name of this accused, "definite Knowledge" cannot follow therefrom to the aforesaid effect. On the contrary, in the present case, we have positive evidence on the record to show that, at the relevant time, this accused No. 1 was found lying in a separate bed room and with her left fractured leg in plaster. In this context, it is also relevant to note that this accused has not been charged for any offence under section 3 (2) of the said Act It is. in these circumstances, extremely doubtful as to how far even knowledge could be relevant for an offence under section 3 (1) of the said Act. I am more than satisfied by the evidence on record that the charges against accused No. 1 have not at all been brought home to her. It is impossible to convict her of the said charges on the evidence on record.