(1.) This is an appeal by the State under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure wherein acquittal of the respondent, an employee in the Post Office, Panjim, is challenged on the ground that it is erroneous.
(2.) I may glance for a few moments at the background of the facts out of which the present appeal arises. The broad facts are that a complaint was lodged against the respondent that he committed theft of the Bombay G. P. O. insured letter no. 478 for Rs. 500/-. The complaint was also under Section 409 of the Penal Code. The learned Magistrate framed the charge against the respondent under Section 409 of the Penal Code and also under Section 52 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898. The trial proceeded against the respondent and after examining a number of witnesses the learned Magistrate directed the acquittal of the accused by his judgement dated 27th January, 1968. He came to the conclusion that "it is not definitely proved that it was the accused who has misappropriated the insured letter for Rs. 500/- addressed to Feliciana Cardoso". He also came to the conclusion that "there is a doubt whether he received it from the hands of P.W. 2 on 22nd March, 1966". P.W. 2 is a Post Master who is said to have given the insured letter along with other postal documents, to the respondent while proceeding on short leave.
(3.) Mr. Leo Gama, learned Public Prosecutor, does not press the appeal in regard to acquittal of the respondent of an offence under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code but, as will appear from the memo of appeal, the grievance of the State is that the acquittal of the respondent of an offence under S.52 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, is void and therefore should be set aside. This Act was brought into force in this territory on 1st September, 1962, vide notification S. O. 2735 bearing the same date. Mr. Gama presses the acquittal appeal, relying on the provisions of Section 530(q) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter referred to as "the Code"). The offence under Section 52 is triable exclusively by the Court of Session by virtue of Section 29(2) read with Schedule II of the Code.