LAWS(BOM)-1949-1-11

SAYED MD ABDULLAH URAIZEE Vs. P V RAO

Decided On January 18, 1949
SAYED MD. ABDULLAH URAIZEE Appellant
V/S
P.V.RAO Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are a number of rules for writs of certiorari and prohibition and orders under Section 15. Specific Relief Act against the Provincial Government, and also against the Secretary of the Health and Local Government Department and Page 1 of 6 Sayed Md. Abdullah Uraizee vs. P.V. Rao and Ors. (18.01.1949 - BOMHC) the Minister concerned, in respect of orders passed under Section 5, Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948. In a recent judgment of a division bench of this Court; in Rao v. Advani, 51 Bom. L. R. 342: (A. I. R. (36) 1949 Bom. 277) to which I was a party, we have held that no proceedings lie either by way of writs of certiorari or prohibition or under Section 15, Specific Relief Act against a Minister or against a Secretary of the appropriate department in respect of the acts of the Provincial Government, and that writs of certiorari and prohibition can only be issued against the Provincial Government. The rules, therefore do not survive as against any parties other than the Provincial Government.

(2.) The question that has been raised as a preliminary issue for determination in these rules is whether a writ of certiorari lies in respect of an act of requisition under Section 5, Bombay Land Requisition Act, (Bom. Act XXXIII [33] of 1948). In the judgment of the Division Bench, to which I have referred above, we held that an order of requisition under Section 3, Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance (Order V [5] of 1947) was a quasi. judicial act, and was, therefore, subject to the prerogative writs of certiorari and prohibition. We came to that conclusion mainly on the ground that the power of requisition under Section 3 of the Ordinance was conditional upon the existence of a public purpose and the question as to what is a public purpose was not left to the discretion of the Provincial Government but had to be objectively determined. The learned Chief Justice in his judgment stated (p. 387):

(3.) The section of the Ordinance which we had to interpret in the appeal was in the following terms: