APPA SAKHARAM MEDKAR Vs. JAGANNATH SAMBHUAPPA GHODKE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a second appeal from a decision of the District Judge of Sholapur. The only question raised for consideration is whether under Section 22 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (Bom. Act XVII of 1879) the material date for the determination of the status of the allleged agriculturist is the date of the attempted attachment or the date of the decree. It is common ground that the decree which was a money decree for Rs. 498 was passed against the respondent on October 14, 1933, as an agriculturist. His privileged status was admitted by the creditor-appellant. In June, 1937, when the decree-holder sought execution of his decree, he claimed attachment of the property of the judgment-debtor on the ground that he had ceased to be an agriculturist at that date, the underlying suggestion being that there was a change in his status since the decree. The learned Judge of the executing Court thought that it was open to the creditor to challenge the status even though conceded at the time of the decree, and accordingly after hearing the evidence he found against the judgment-debtor's plea to the contrary and issued a warrant of attachment. In appeal a contrary view prevailed. The learned District Judge, relying upon the full bench case of Maneklal v. Mahipatram (1927) 29 Bom. L. R. 1109 : S. C. I. L. R. 51 Bom. 454, F. B. , held that the judgment-debtor, who sought the protection of Section 22 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, should show either that he was then within the general definition contained in Section 2 of the Act or that he was within that definition at the date when the liability was incurred, namely, at the time of the decree. Accordingly he allowed the appeal, and set aside the order of attachment of the property of the judgment-debtor. Against that order the decree-holder has filed this appeal.

(2.) A preliminary objection has been raised by the respondent that inasmuch as the decretal debt is less than Rs. 500 no second appeal lies under Section 102 of the Civil Procedure Code. That argument is well founded, and the objection has to be allowed. But we are asked, and we accede to the request of the learned advocate for the appellant, to convert this appeal into a civil revisional application as a substantial question of law is involved affecting the jurisdiction of the executing Court to enquire into the status of the judgment-debtor. We have accordingly heard the advocates treating this as a civil revisional application.

(3.) THE full bench in Maneklal v. Mahipatram (1927) 29 Bom. L. R. 1109 : s. c. I. L. R. 51 Bom. 454, f. b. were dealing with the question as to whether protection could be afforded to the judgment-debtor under Section 21 from arrest if he could show either that he was at the date of the arrest within the general definition or that he was within that definition at the date when the liability was incurred, and the Court came to the conclusion that the material date for the determination of the status was the date of the attempted arrest; but by reason of the definition of the term agriculturist in Clause (2) of Section 2, that determination might also import the determination of his status at the date when the liability arose. THE cogency of that reasoning, if I may say so with respect, could not be questioned in the consideration of the application of the provisions of Section 2, Clause (2), for the interpretation of Section 22 But it has been argued that the construction may in certain cases lead to illogical results, and upon a close examination of the various Section of the Act, it was pointed out that there was a defect in drafting which might create mischief and, instead of subserving the object of the enactment, defeat it. We were also referred to the rule of construction contained in Section 2 which says that " in construing this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context, the following rules shall be observed. " With regard to the illogical consequences of strictly following the Act, there can be no two opinions, and it has more than once been pointed out that the Act, as it stands, is extremely defective and prcductive of hardship. But I fail to see how upon the application of the definition in Section 2, Clause (2), to Section 22, there can be repugnancy. All that can be said is that upon the construction adopted in the lower Court the immunity would attach to the judgment-debtor during his lifetime. But that is no repugnancy. That might be unreasonable in the result. But that is no ground for departing from the plain meaning of the words used in the statute. " From the words of the law there should not be any departure " is a healthy rule of construction so J. far as the Acts of the Legislature are concerned, and it would be a dangerous experiment to adopt any interpretation contrary to the express letter of the statute. Personally speaking, a disturbance of that language, such as is pressed upon us in argument, would cause greater harm to the agriculturist. After establishing the status, the creditor would be prone, if permitted, to subject the agriculturist to continuous harassment in the process of execution, by alleging that the status which had been established in the suit had been changed. That would be more unfortunate in its consequences than the hardship to the creditor. THEre is neither any ambiguity in the provisions nor any obscurity of the intention of the Legislature, and apart from the suggestion of unreasonableness there is not ground for holding that the intention as expressed would be defeated. It is true that Section 20 to 22 are different in their wording, and perhaps it might be proper to argue that the full bench case of Maneklal v. Mahipatram could not be regarded as an authority for the construction of Section 22 But even if it were not an authority, and the remarks of the learned Chief Justice are susceptible of the view that the decision was intended to be confined to the provisions of Section 21, I see the greatest difficulty in not giving effect to the definition of agriculturist contained in Section 2, Clause (2 ). As I have already stated, if that definition were designed by the Legislature to protect the interests of the agriculturists, when once the status was established at the hearing, for the purpose of the proceedings following upon a decree obtained thereunder, I think the respondent is entitled to rely upon that proof of status for the purpose of claiming exemption from attachment of his property. I would therefore confirm the decree of the lower appellate Court. Accordingly the rule will be discharged with costs. Indarnarayen, J.