NARBHERAMJI GYANIRAMJI RAMSNEHI Vs. VIVEKRAMJI BHAGATRAMJI RAMSNEHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal from an order of the Assistant Judge of Ahmedabad. The only point argued on the appeal is one of limitation, and it arises in this way.

(2.) THE plaintiff is suing to recover the Ramsnehi Sampradaya temple at Ahmedabad, which is in the possession of the defendant. THE plaintiff claims as the successor of Snehiramji, who founded the religious institution to which this temple belongs. THEre are three Ramdwars belonging to the institution,one at Surat, one at Baroda and one at Ahmedabad. THE Ramdwar at Surat is the headquarters, where the plaintiff resides, and, according to the plaintiff's case, the Ramdwar at Ahmedabad is managed by the defendant as his agent. On the other hand, the defendant contends that he is the mahant of the Ahmedabad Ramdwar in his own right, and the plaintiff has no interest therein. THE learned Judge framed issues dealing with the title to the Ahmedabad Ramdwar, and held that the plaintiff had established his title as the owner of the property as mahant, and that the defendant was only his manager, and accordingly he ordered the defendant to hand over the possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. On this appeal the point is taken that the plaintiff's suit must fail under Article 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. That point was not raised in the Court below, and is, therefore, not discussed by the learned Judge. But it can undoubtedly be raised in appeal, and indeed any question of limitation must be taken by the Court. THE point arises in this way.

(3.) ARTICLE 14 of the Indian Limitation Act provides that an application to set aside any act or order of an officer of Government in his official capacity, not herein otherwise expressly provided for, shall be brought within one year from the date of the act or order. It is contended that the decision of the inquiry officer is an order of a Government officer, and the sanad is an act of such officer in his official capacity, and I think those two points may be conceded. But the question is whether this is a suit to set aside an act or an order of a Government officer within ARTICLE 14 Certainly the plaint does not ask in terms that the order or sanad be set aside. It does ask for possession, and the contention put forward by the appellant is that the Court could not make an order for possession in face of this sanad, but must set aside the sanad first, and that any order for possession as against the appellant involves setting aside the sanad on which he relies. That argument, I think, might prevail, if the sanad were an ordinary document of title. If a plaintiff is suing for possession, and the defendant relies on a conveyance from the plaintiff or his predecessor, it may be necessary to set that conveyance aside before the plaintiff can get an order for possession, and in these circumstances the suit for possession would be in substance a suit to set aside a document within the Indian Limitation Act, though that relief be not expressly asked for. To my mind the real question on this appeal is, whether the sanad, which is much more precise than the order of the inquiry officer, amounts to something in the nature of a document of title, which must be set aside before the plaintiff can get an order for possession. Mr. Coyajee for the appellant relies on a dictum of Sir Norman Macleod in Ulawappa v. Gadigewa (1925) 27 Bom. L. R. 948 in which he refers to a sanad granted under Section 133 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code as in the nature of a document of title, but in that case the learned Chief Justice was not considering the question which we have to deal with. To my mind a sanad granted under Section 133 is not strictly speaking in the nature of a document of title between litigating parties. It is a document affecting rights only between the Crown and the person to whom it is granted. The object of an inquiry under the Land Revenue Code is to determine the right of Government to revenue, and for that purpose to survey the land and to determine who is the holder and, therefore, liable to assessment. But an order made under the Land Revenue Code is not, in my opinion, intended to operate, and does not operate, finally as a determination of title between subjects of Government. No doubt an order made under the, Land Revenue Code is prima facie evidence of title, but it is not conclusive and may be over-ridden as other evidence may be overridden. It is not, in my opinion, essential for a person in the position of the plaintiff in this case claiming possession against the defendant, who has been granted a sanad Under Section 133, to obtain an order setting aside that the sanad before he can obtain an order for recovery of possession from a civil Court, It is always open to the revenue authorities to correct their record, and if the plaintiff, having obtained an order for possession or an order declaring his title from a competent civil Court, goes to the revenue authorities, I have no doubt that the necessary corrections will be made in the revenue records. But the revenue records, in my opinion, are not conclusive in favour of the defendant as against the plaintiff, and it is not, therefore, essential that the Court should make an order setting aside the sanad before granting an order for possession to the plaintiff.