AYYANGOUDA BASANGOUDA AYYANGOUDAR Vs. GADIGEPPAGOUDA HUCHANGOUDA AYYANGOUDAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE question raised by this appeal from a decree of the First Class Subordinate Judge of Dharwar relates principally to the validity of the adoption of the plaintiff and also his right as an adopted son to claim a share in certain properties acquired by a sole surviving coparcener in the adoptive father's family prior to his adoption. THE relevant facts for the purpose of this appeal can be shortly stated.

(2.) ONE Basangouda and his two sons Huchangouda and Ayyangouda, defendant No.1 in the case, were members of an undivided Hindu family. Basangouda's two sons survived him, and the elder Huchangouda died first in 1910 leaving a widow Dyamavva. The sole surviving coparcener Ayyangouda was in possession of the entire estate and he entered into: an agreement in 1915 with Dyamavva, the widow of his deceased brother, in regard to her maintenance. Under that agreement, which was incorporated in a registered document on August 26, 1915, certain lands and a house were allowed to Dyamavva for her maintenance and were handed over into her possession. Five years later, on July 5, 1920, one of the properties was returned by the widow in exchange for another. Since then till December 17, 1923, the widow remained in possession of the property. For some reasons she then thought of returning the property to Ayyangouda in lieu of a cash allowance payable to her annually for her maintenance. That was the subject of a third agreement executed in 1923. About that time it appears that Ayyangouda had got two sons, who are defendants Nos. 2 and 3, and another son was born to him subsequently. On June 26, 1933, Dyamavva took the plaintiff in adoption according to the custom of the community, and she executed a registered deed of adoption on that date. The fact that the plaintiff was adopted in proper form has not been seriously disputed in this appeal. The Court below on the evidence tendered was in my opinion right in concluding that the adoption was formally made.

(3.) THE next document (exhibit 14) is a mere exchange of one property for another and like the first it is significantly silent as to the alleged term in the agreement to relinquish her right to adopt. THE third document (exhibit 15), after reciting the properties agreed to be surrendered to the husband's coparcener or brother and mentioning the cash amount that was agreed to be received by the widow from him in lieu of the surrendered properties, proceeds in para. 4 to narrate the object of the fresh agreement: She says " I am a woman and on account of famine etc. , it is not possible for me to rent the lands and recover the same. " THEre again there is no reference to any contemplated adoption. Nothing could be more fantastic than the suggestion that these three documents constitute a relinquishment of the widow's right to adopt or bear that interpretation.