(1.) Ex praecedentibus et consequentibus optima fit interpretatio The best interpretation is made from things preceding and following.
(2.) It is significant to note that the traditional English view earlier held that Legislative intent is not to be gathered from the Parliamentary history and felt that introduction of the measures in Parliament cannot be used as evidence for the purpose of showing the intention. The Law then gradually changed its course and it was held that the courts are entitled to consider such external or historical facts as may be necessary to understand the subject matter to which the statute relates. The House of Lords in BlackClawsan International Ltd. v. Papierwerke WaldhofAschaffenburg, A.G., 1975 1 AllER 810 (HL) unanimously held that the report of a committee presented to Parliament preceding the legislation could be seen for finding out the then state of the law and the mischief required to be remedied. The earlier traditional view came to be criticized and the entire Law tilted more in favour of considering the surrounding circumstances and permitted use of such aid for better interpretation of the provisions. The school of thought that limited but open use should be made of Parliamentary history in construing 1 Referred in Principles of Statutory Interpretation (11th Edition 2008) Justice G.P. Sing Wadhwa & Co. Nagpur. statutes has been gaining ground as indicated in English Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission as contended in (1970) 33 Modern Law Review 197. Lord Browne Wilkinson said, "Reference to parliamentary material should be permitted as an aid to the construction of legislation which is ambiguous or obscure or the literal meaning of which leads to absurdity. Even in such cases references in court to parliamentary material should only be permitted in given circumstances.
(3.) Under the American practice, the traditional English practice was relaxed much earlier and now, the law liberally permits reference to historical background. In India, the modern view prevalent in these two systems have been applied with greater freedom and free of restrictions. Right from the case of State of Mysore v. R.V. Bidap, 1973 AIR(SC) 2555, it has been seen that Courts have now veered to the view that legislative history within circumspect limits may be consulted by courts in resolving ambiguities. The use of such remedy has to be purposive that is to achieve the purpose and for finding of the mischief dealt with by the statute or for better attainment of the object of the Legislature. To put it more simply the provisions of a statute and particularly of a procedural code need to be examined very objectively while applying the rule of plain construction at the same time keeping in mind the need to examine the attending circumstances in the backdrop of legislative history. It is a settled principle of law that the construction and interpretation of procedure law may normally be not controlled by the rule of strict construction if such application is likely to frustrate the very object of the procedural law. The procedural law like Civil Procedure Code is intended to control and regulate the procedure and judicial proceedings to achieve the ends of justice and expeditious disposal. The provisions of procedural law which do not provide for penal consequences in default of compliance normally would be construed as directory in nature and would receive liberal construction. In the case of Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, 1955 AIR(SC) 425, the Supreme Court had taken the view that procedure is mere machinery and its object is to facilitate and not to obstruct administration of justice. The Code of Civil Procedure should, therefore, be considered liberally as far as possible. Its interpretation should not be permitted or allowed to defeat the substantial justice. The attendant circumstances and external aids being some of the tools available with the court for interpretation of a statute, their application has been largely accepted. In the case of SubCommittee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India and others, 1991 4 SCC 699, the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court took the view that it was permissible to take into consideration the entire background as aid to interpretation and that it was a well settled principle of modern statutory construction that external aid could be used to discover the object of legislation particularly when internal aids are not forthcoming. Similar view was also accepted by the Supreme Court in the case of Shashikant Laxman Kale and another v. Union of India and another, 1990 4 SCC 366, where the court held as under: