KANJI PASU MALDE Vs. BALKRISHNA HARIBHAI NAMADE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY this petition, the petitioner has challenged the Order dated 5th August, 1985 passed by the Additional District Judge, Sangli, in Civil Appeal No.220 of 1981. That Appeal was filed by the Petitioner challenging the judgment and decree dated 15th April, 1981 passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Miraj, in Regular Civil Suit No.379 of 1973. That suit was filed by the Respondent for possession of the property bearing C.T.S. No.196/A & B, situate near Mission Hospital, Miraj and further claiming that the Petitioner is a tenant of the shop in the building owned by the Respondent. The Respondent-landlord sought decree of eviction on various grounds including the ground that the tenant had made alterations of permanent nature in the shop without obtaining permission from the landlord. The trial Court found in favour of the landlord and passed a decree of eviction against the tenant and directed the tenant to vacate the suit premises. In the Appeal filed by the tenant, the finding on this ground recorded by the trial Court in favour of the landlord was confirmed and the Appeal was dismissed. Therefore, in this petition filed by the tenant, the concurrent finding recorded by both the Courts below that the tenant made alterations of permanent nature in the suit shop is challenged.

(2.) THE facts necessary for deciding this petition are that on 2nd February, 1966, one D.R.Kadam addressed a letter to the landlord informing him that the tenant had removed the wall on the rear side of the shop and had fitted a door there. The landlord issued a notice to the tenant alleging therein that the petitioner had removed the wall on the southern side of the shop and fitted a door there, which, according to the landlord, was an alteration of a permanent nature. In the plaint, the allegation was repeated. Thus the only construction which was made the ground for the decree of evication against the tenant was the removal of a portion of the wall on he southern side of the shop and putting up a door there. Both the Courts below have held that this amounts to an alteration of permanent nature and, therefore, makes the tenant liable to suffer the decree of eviction.

(3.) NOW , it is to be seen here that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Venkatlal's case referred to above is construing the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act, under which this case also arises. In paragraph twentyone of the judgment, the Supreme Court has observed thus :