MULJI JADHAVJI Vs. HARIBANSH PUNWASI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY this petition, the petitioner challenges the order dated 29.10.1985 passed by Division Bench of the Small Causes Court at Bombay in appeal No.224 of 1971. That appeal was filed by the respondent challenging the judgment and decree dated 31st March 1971 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Small Causes Court at Bombay in R.A.E. No.1733 of 1965. The Suit was filed by the respondent claiming to be owner of a vacant plot of land at Mulund being plot no.830 survey no.1000 situated at Subhash Chandra Road, Mulund, Mumbai. He claimed that the respondent is a tenant of the portion. He claimed decree of eviction under section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act. The trial Court recorded findings in favour of the landlord and decreed the suit in favour of the landlord and directed the tenant to vacate the suit premises. In the appeal filed by the tenant, however, the appellate Court reversed the findings recorded by the trial Court, allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and dismissed the suit filed by the landlord.

(2.) IT is pertinent to note here that the suit was initially filed by the then owner of the plot however, after filing of the suit, the plot was transferred in favour of the present plaintiff-petitioner who was substituted as plaintiff in the suit and suit was prosecuted by the present petitioners.

(3.) TO appreciate the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act. The section lays down that the landlord shall be entitled to recover the possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied whether the land reasonably and bonafidely required by the landlord for erection of new building. Perusal of this provision shows that the decree of possession can be passed in favour of the landlord on satisfaction being recorded by the Court that the landlord requires the land for erection of new building. It is thus clear that the landlord has to establish the plea of requirement before the Court and for establishing this plea of requirement, the purpose for which the new building is to be constructed, in my opinion, becomes relevant. The purpose for which the building is to be put up becomes relevant in order to establish before the Court the requirement of the landlord and also that the requirement of the landlord is both reasonable and bonafide. If the matter is perused from this point of view, it becomes clear, as has been found by the appellate Court that there are material contradictions between the testimony of the plaintiff and his witness who is his Manager. The appellate Court has found that according to the Manager, the building for the factory on the ground floor and residence on the upper floor is required to be constructed by the landlord on the suit premises whereas according to the landlord, only residential premises are required to be constructed. The Court found that because of these contradictions in the deposition of two witnesses of the landlord, the landlord has failed to establish his requirement of constructing the new building. Perusal of the judgment of the appellate Court shows that there is definite material available on record to support the findings that have been recorded by the appellate Court. To my mind, it is a case of appreciation of evidence on record. It is now settled law that even if in a given case, it is possible to come to a different conclusion than the conclusion arrived at by the appellate Court after appreciating the evidence, is no ground for this Court to interfere with the findings recorded by the appellate Court, unless this Court comes to the conclusion that on the basis of evidence on record it is impossible to reach the conclusion which is reached by the appellate Court. As I find that the conclusion that is reached by the appellate Court is a possible one to be reached on the basis of material on record, in my opinion, I will not be justified in interfering with the findings recorded by the appellate Court in my jurisdiction under article 227 of Constitution of India.