BUDDHIKOTA Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner in this case Buddhikota Subbarao is being prosecuted for the offences punishable under S. 3 (1) (c), 3 (1) (C) read with S. 9, 6 (2) (a), 6 (2) (b) of the Official Secrets Act, 1923. He is also being prosecuted for the offences punishable under S. 24 (1) (d) read with S. 18 (2) and S. 24 (2) (d) read with S. 19 (b) of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. The said trial is pending in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge for Greater Bombay.

(2.) IN this petition the petitioner has challenged Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 9 and 14 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923, being violative of Arts. 14, 19 (1) (a), (g), 20 (1) and 21 of the Constitution. According to the petitioner in the absence of definitions of the various expressions used in the Act, the conviction under S. 3 of the said Act will necessarily rest upon unwarranted subjective and arbitrary notion. The expression 'interest of the State' as used in S. 3 can throw open wide doors to arbitrariness and unreasonableness. Similarly, absence of definitions of other terms and expressions, such as "secret official code or pass word", enemy, foreign agent, or foreign power, etc. leaves vagueness in the whole enactment which is bound to result in arbitrariness and, therefore, these provisions ate violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is also contended that S. 3 (2) and 4 (2) which deal with the raising of a presumption is also arbitrary. Though the ingredients of S. 5 are substantially akin to those of S. 3 of the Act, it provides for a different punishment which is also violative of Art 14 of the Constitution. Initially petitioner had also challenged S. 14 of the Act but the said challenge was given up during the course of arguments.

(3.) SHRI Pradhan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that since various terms and phrases are not defined in the Act, no definite meaning could be assigned, to them. This results in vagueness and arbitrariness. The provisions dealing with the presumption or burden of proof are also onerous as it practically denies any defence to the accused. It also, runs counter or contrary to S. 54 of the Evidence Act. In substance therefore, it is contended by him that the procedure prescribed is not just, fair and reasonable therefore, could safely be learned as arbitrary, and hence violative of Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution.