SADA YESSU DESSAI Vs. RANGE FOREST OFFICER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) - A criminal case under the Goa. Daman and Diu Preservation of Trees Act, 1984 was filed by the Range Forest Officer, Margao, against the petitioners herein. The Petitioners raised the plea of limitation alleging that the complaint was filed more than one year after the Forest Department Authorities were informed about the Commission of the offence. The learned Magistrate upheld this objection and by her order dated 1st September, 1987, dismissed the case. A Revision Application was filed by the respondents herein in the Sessions Court, Margao, and the learned Additional Sessions Judge allowed the said Application by his impugned Judgment dated 6th June, 1988. The learned Judge observed that there was no delay in filing the complaint, but, if such delay existed, it was of only one day which was to be condoned suo moto by the Court in the interest of justice.

(2.) Mr. Diniz, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, contents before me that the learned Additional Sessions Judge proceeded on a completely wrong footing to pass the impugned judgment. In fact and first of all, the learned Judge was wrong in holding that there was no delay at all and that if at all delay existed the same was of only one day. He failed to appreciate that the information has been given to the Deputy Conservator of Forests, who is under the Act, the Tree Officer, on 23rd January, 1985, and therefore, the limitation was starting as per Section 469 (1) (d) of the Criminal Procedure Code from the date of the knowledge of the Commission of the offence. The learned Judge, however, proceeded on the wrong footing that the range Forest Officer had conducted the raid on 29th January, 1985, and completed it on 30th January, and therefore, since the complaint was filed 1D the court on 29th January, 1986, it was well within the time. From the facts mentioned above, the learned Counsel further urged, it is clear that the knowledge of the offence was from 23rd January, 1985, and since the complaint was filed on 29th January, 1986, the delay in filing the complaint was of six days. That apart, the learned Counsel submits that the learned Judge could not have interfered with the order of the Trial Court in a Revision Application. The learned Magistrate has exercised her discretion In favour of the Petitioners and there was no error committed by her to justified the interference by the Sessions Court in exercise of revisions powers. In any event, the respondents has not sought condensation of delay nor has explained satisfactorily the delay.

(3.) There is no doubt whatsoever that Mr. Diniz is right when he submits that the knowledge of the offence was given to the Tree Officer who happened to be the Deputy Conservator of Forests, on 23rd January, 1985, and that the complaint having been filed only on 29th January, 1986, there was a delay of six days in filing it. The question that the Deputy Conservator of Forests forwarded the complaint to the complainant only on 25th January, 1985, and that the latter conducted the search only on 29th January, 1985, is not relevant. The learned Counsel is also right in his submission that, ordinarily, the learned Additional Sessions Judge ought not to have interfered with the order of the Trial Magistrate which was made in exercise of her discretion. However, one cannot leave aside some facts of this case, namely, that the timber stored was worth about Rupees One Lakh. This shows that the amount of timber stored was huge and a considerable number of trees had been cut. The charge is that the cutting of the trees, bas been done without licence, and therefore, the charge is by nature serious. The delay is only of six days and considered all circumstancial of the case, in my considered opinion, the exercise of the powers conferred on the court by section 473 of Criminal Procedure Code was entirely justified. The learned Additional Sessions Judge although without quoting the said section of Law, exercise such powers for the interest of Justice. This being so, I do not think that it will be proper for this court to interfere with the impugned order on a more technicality.