RAJU MAHAVIR SHAH Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These petitions by persons claiming to be a lessee and lessor respectively impugn an order passed by the Addl. Commissioner Konkan Division in an appeal under section 33 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the U.L.C. Act.

(2.) Land bearing Survey No. 151-A City Survey Nos. 461 and 462 etc.etc. of village Nahur, Taluka Kurla was formerly part of the Bhandup Estate which held it along with other properties as Inam land. This type of grant along with others were abolished vide section 5 of the Bombay Personal Inam Abolition Act, 1952 hereinafter to be known as the Abolition Act. A proper understanding of the controversy to be resolved requires a categorisation of the lis personae. First, are the petitioners, to be referred to by their surnames i.e. Shah and Patil. The latter claims to be an inferior holder of the land-his rights having been enlarged into full-fledged ownership by the Abolition Act. Shah claims to be the son and heir of Patils lessee under a document dated 11 October, 1960 styled as an agreement to lease. Pitted against these gentlemen are the Bafnas whose victory in the impugned order has given rise to the instant petitions. Under gift deed dated 14th January, 1971 they as trustees of the Bafna Charitable Trust have accepted a donation of the land in dispute from the Bhandup Estate. As far back as 1968 and in fact prior thereto, there had existed a dispute between the Estate and Patil as to the latters status. On 2 September, 1968, the Commissioner held that Patil had been recorded as a protected tenant and that if he claimed a higher right, the proper forum was a Civil Court. Eventually Patil did file a suit and the same is said to be pending.

(3.) With the coming into force the U.L.C. Act, the Deputy Collector as the Competent Authority called upon Shahs father (then alive) to submit a statement under section 6(1) of the said Act. The same was scrutinised resulting in a declaration under section 8(4). This was followed by a Notification dated 21 November, 1985 under section 10(1) declaring the land as vacant and therefore expropriable. Shah moved the Government for exemption under section 20 of the U.L.C. Act, on March 2, 1988 the same was granted. The Bafnas in the section 33 appeal against Shah-but not Patil-impugned the order of the competent authority under section 8(4) of the U.L.C. Act. Shah raised objections such as locus-standi of Bafnas and limitation in answer to the appeal. In regard to the first point, Shahs contention was that Bafnas not being parties to the U.L.C. Act proceedings and not having been served with a copy of the orders passed, could not be persons aggrieved within the meaning of section 31. Next the appeal preferred by them in 1988 was obviously beyond time. A more substantial ground was that the order sought to be set aside by the Bafnas had been superseded by the Governments section 20 notification. The Commissioner as an authority subordinate to the Government could not set aside this exemption notification. Patil a party vitally affected was not impleaded to the appeal and therefore the order was non est. The Commissioner negatived these contentions and held that the declaration under section 8(4) in so far as it pertained to Survey No. 151-A was liable to be set aside. Shah & Patil re-agitate these contentions in the instant petitions and the Bafnas defend the order impugned.