SADANAND NAGESH WAIKAR Vs. THARUMAL GADUMAL MIRPURE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an acquittal appeal arising out of prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

(2.) The article in question was ice candy which, on analysis, was found to contain saccharin. The learned trial Magistrate has recorded an order of acquittal by a very detail and exhaustive judgment. The acquittal is based on several grounds including breach of some of the mandatory rules of the Rules framed under the aforesaid Act. It was also found that it was not established that all the relevant requirements under Rule 16 were complied with. There was also no clear proof either in the evidence or in the panchnama of four distinct and clear impressions of seal of the sender on the wrapper. Indeed, the only panch witness examined admitted that no seal was affixed on the stopper over the jar. Record further shows that the sample was sent to the public analyst on 4th June, 1978. The same was taken up for analysis by different assistants and at different dates. As deposed to by the public analyst, the sample was taken up for analysis on 18th June, 1978 and the analysis was completed on 4th July, 1978. The report was signed on 11th July, 1978 and the same was sent and received on 22nd July, 1978. The prosecution was launched on 10th October, 1978 and communication to the accused of the report of the public analyst, was sent on 16th October, 1978. The Food inspector also does not categorically depose to the compliance of the various rules in relation to the collection of sample, wrapping and the sealing process, though he does submit generally that all the procedure as per the Act was followed.

(3.) Appreciating the evidence, on record, the trial Court has sound this to be a fit case for recording an order of acquittal. Reappreciating the said evidence and hearing the submissions of the respective Counsel before us, we find that this is a case where we would not be justified in interfering with the impugned acquittal. It may be possible to take a different view of the matter. Sitting as a trial Court we would perhaps have a even recorded a different order ago in their favour by the trial Magistrate. It however, cannot be said that the view taken by the trial Magistrate was clearly unreasonable. The impugned judgment reflects a view which cannot be effectively demolished. Such being the position and even if one were inclined to differ from the inferences and conclusions of the trial Court, it is not open to us to do once we find that the view of the trial Court is also a possible view of the matter. It is on this short ground that we do not interfere.