AGARWAL INDUSTRIES Vs. S.D. RANE AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner has filed this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the correctness of the order dated Oct. 6, 1976 passed by the Presiding Officer, Fifth Labour Court, Bombay. The petitioner Agarwal Industries is a partnership firm and respondent No. 2 represent the Employee's working under the petitioner firm. The petitioner firm filed an application under Sec. 25 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') before the Fifth Labour Court, Bombay, for a declaration that the strike commenced by the Employee's of the petitioner firm from Sept. 9, 1976 was illegal. The petitioner also applied for an injunction restraining the Employee's from resorting to strike during the period of operation of settlement or until the termination of the settlement effected on March 29, 1976.

(2.) The petition filed under Sec. 25 of the Act was resisted by respondent No. 2 mainly on the ground that there is no provision in the Act which confers powers on the Labour Court to hear and decide the reference seeking a declaration that the strike is illegal. Respondent No. 1, the Presiding Officer, Fifth Labour Court, framed a preliminary issue as regards the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain and decide the reference and by an order dated Oct. 6, 1976, held that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to declare the strike as illegal. In consonance with this finding the reference filed by the petitioner was rejected. The Labour Court took the view that the powers of the Labour Court under the Act are governed by the provisions of Sec. 7 of the Act. Respondent No. 11 was of the view that special Court's are constituted by the provisions of Sec. 6 of the Act. Such Labour Court's are competent to decide the matters which come only under Sec. 7 of the Act and as Sec. 7 makes no reference to the reference under Sec. 25 of the Act, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference under Sec. 25. The Labour Court also took the view that provisions of Sec. 32 of the Act cannot be resorted to, as the powers conferred under Sec. 32 are merely in reference to the ancillary matters arising out of an application or a complaint referred to it. The order passed by the Labour Court is challenged in this petition.

(3.) Mr. Kapadia, the learned advocate who appears in support of petition, submits that the order passed by the Labour Court is vitiated on more than one ground. Mr. Kapadia first contends that the Labour Court was in error in ignoring the provisions of S. 25. There is an implied power conferred on the Labour Court to give a declaration that the strike is illegal. It was next contended by the learned advocate that, in any event, the provision of S- 32 empowers the Labour Court to decide all matters arising out of any application or a complaint referred to it for decision under any of the provisions of the Act. We find considerable substance in the contentions raised by the learned Advocate.