THE STATE Vs. PUKHRAJ CHIMANLAL JAIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These four appeals challenge the orders of acquittal passed in four Criminal Cases which were decided by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 28th Court, Bombay. These Criminal Cases are Nos. 107/P of 1975, 108/P of 1975, 109/P of 1975 and 110/P of 1975. All these cases were heard together and by a common judgment were disposed of by the earned trial Magistrate by his order dated 28th July, 1976. The cases were instituted on a complaint filed by the Food Inspector of Bombay against the respondent who was the accused in all the four cases.

(2.) According to the prosecution, the Food Inspector visited the shop of the accused on 23rd March, 1973 and purchased from him several packets of what has been described as white sweetening powder packed in packets of 100 gms. each. It is not necessary for me to trace the manner of taking and [rending the sample. The statutory purchase was made four times on the same day and a sample from each purchase was sent to the Public Analyst whose [report discloses that each of the samples contained Dulcin which, according to the Public Analyst, is harmful to the health. After obtaining the necessary sanction from the Commissioner, Food and Drugs Administration, the accused as prosecuted for an offence punishable under Sec. 16(l)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. In particular, it must be mentioned the accused was charged as follows:-

(3.) The State has preferred these four appeals from the acquittals and Mr. Patil, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing in support of these appeals, sought to assail the acquittals on various grounds. In the first place, he sought lo contend that the sample which was of sweetening powder was undoubtedly a sample of food and it was sold in sealed packets and according to Mr. Patil, if the packets did not bear the name of the product and other brands as mentioned in R.I. 32, then the accused would be guilty of selling a misbranded article within the meaning of Sec. 2(ix) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. He, therefore, ought to have been held guilty of the said offence. It is impossible to accept this contention of the learned Public Prosecutor because in so many words the accused was charged with the offence of selling an adulterated food containing a substance called Dulcin which was said to be injurious to the health. To convict him of this alternative charge as contended by the learned Public Prosecutor, would be to give a go-by to well established principles of criminal trials in this country.