JOHN JOSEPH KUMMEL Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE point that falls for consideration in this appeal is within a narrow compass, The Petitioner had filed a complaint against one Patil Bama Mhatre, who is the landlord of the premises, of which the Petitioner is a tenant, for the offence under Section 18 (1) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act ). The allegation of the Petitioner was that by a written agreement dated the 10th of Aug. 1971, the Accused Patil Bama had granted him a lease in respect of the premises by accepting from him a sum of Rs. 3,000/- as premium. Since the receipt of the premium or any consideration, for grant of lease was barred by the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the said Act and was made a cognizable offence, the Accused was guilty of the same.

(2.) THE learned Magistrate on the evidence led before him, convicted the Accused for the said offence and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for one day and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,500/- and in default to simple imprisonment for three months. The Accused appealed against the said order of conviction and sentence. While the appeal was pending, the Accused died and that is how Respondents Nos. 2 to 6, who are his heirs and legal representatives came on record and prosecuted the appeal. The learned Appellate Judge allowed the appeal on the ground that the prosecution was launched beyond the period of limitation as prescribed in Section 468 read with Section 469 of the Cr. P. C. 1973, i. e. the new Code. In the view that he took, the learned Sessions Judge quashed the conviction and sentence. It is this order of the learned Sessions Judge, which is appealed against in the present appeal.

(3.) MR. Chitnis, learned Counsel appearing for the complainant-appellant raised three contentions. His first contention was that the period of limitation prescribed in Section 468 read with Section 469 of the New Code should be counted from the date when the new Code came into force, i. e. from the 1st of April 1974. Under the old Code there was no limitation prescribed and therefore the period of one year prescribed by Sub-clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 468 which is the period of limitation in the present case would be over only on the 31st of March 1975. The present prosecution was launched on the 9th of July 1974 and therefore the prosecution was in time and was not barred by limitation. His second contention was that in any case the acceptance of Rs. 3,000/- by the Accused for grant of lease was continuing offence and therefore the prosecution, as launched could not be said to be without limitation. Lastly, he contended that the benefit of Section 473 of the new Code could not be denied to the complainant and the Court had discretion to entertain a complaint even after the expiry of the period of limitation.