(1.) The petitioner is in possession of survey No. 40 situated at village Galothe Khurd, Akkalkuwa, District Dhulia. The petitioner claims to have purchased the same from respondent No. 5 who, according to the State, is au Adivasi, Action against the petitioner was taken under Section 59 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code of 1966, hereinafter referred to as 'the Code', with a view to dispossess him on the ground that the transaction of sale in his favour by the Adivasi without the prior permission of the Revenue Authority when the purchaser himself was not an Adivasi, was void. This had made his possession unlawful rendering him liable to be dispossessed. Order to this effect was passed by the Tahsildar of Akkalkuwa on 12-6-1972- The petitioner preferred an appeal to the District Deputy Collector, Nandur-bar. He also made an application for stay. His application for stay was rejected by him on the only ground of the claimant being an Adivasi. The Collector also refused to interfere with the same. The petitioner, therefore, preferred this Special Civil Application on 21-6-1973. His grievance in this petition is that the Appellate Authority was not justified in refusing stay when the appeal was still pending before him. At the time of admission, a Division Bench of this Court granted rule on 22-6-1972, and also stay "till the disposal of this petition or the appeal before the District Deputy Collector."
(2.) Mr. Bhimiao Naik, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, contends that authorities have acted arbitrarily in refusing stay during the pendency of the appeal and mere circumstance of the claimant being an Adivasi cannot be relevant for refusing stay. We find it difficult to resist the force of this contention. The impugned order is expressly passed under S. 59 of the Code. S. 247 thereof makes this order appealable while S. 256 enables the appellate authority to grant stay during the pendency of the appeal with conditions if found necessary. Mr. Salik, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, is right in contending that, stay cannot be claimed as of right by any litigant, it being entirely within the discretion of the appellate authority. Even so, such a discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably by reference only to the relevant reasons.
(3.) We are unable to see how claimant's being an Adivasi by itself could be relevant under S. 256 or any other section. As backward and illiterate citizens, Adivasi undoubtedly are entitled to protection. The object of (1) subjecting the transfers of lands by Adivasi to prior permission under Section 36 (2) and (2) enabling the Collector to restore possession of lands to Adivasi on their transfer in breach of such restrictions under S. 36 (3) is laudable and unexceptionable. However, mere claim of being an Adivasi and a victim of such reach, cannot place him higher than any other claimant under the provisions of the Code seeking possession, or any other plaintiff in civil court, claiming title to any claim in litigation. No person can claim to be put in possession by dispossessing the other, without the proper trial and adjudication of the claims and the disputes. Authority of law for dispossession would be woefully lacking but for such adjudication. In other words, the maintenance of the status quo till such proper adjudication of the claim is simply indispensible. This indeed is a procedural safeguard against arbitrary dispossessions and false claims and indeed the essence of the rule of law. No Court or authority can afford to ignore it without erroding the fundamentals of the same.