(1.) This appeal under Section 417(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is directed against the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Panjim, dated 23th March, 1968, whereby he gave benefit of doubt to the accused Anand Lakshiman Chari and directed his acquittal. The State is the appellant.
(2.) The prosecution case before the learned Magistrate was that complainant Dwarcanata Sirsat from Mapusa had given car No. IGA-28-23 of Austin make for repairs to the accused in November 1963. It was at the end of 1966 that the complainant Dwarcanata Sirsat visited the workshop of the accused and found that some of the parts of the car given for repairs were sold by the accused. He therefore lodged a complaint with the Police and after necessary investigation the accused was challaned under Section 406 of the Indian. Penal Code. The prosecution examined six witnesses in support of their case. On behalf of the accused were examined six defence witnesses. The defence of the accused before the learned Magistrate was that he had purchased this car from the complainant. This defence was disbelieved by the learned Magistrate and, accordingly, he convicted him under Section 406 I.P.C. and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 400/- or, in default, to undergo 3 months' imprisonment. The accused felt aggrieved by this decision and hence filed an appeal in the Court of Session. The learned Sessions Judge, after considering the prosecution evidence and the defence evidence, came to the conclusion that the prosecution had not proved beyond doubt that the accused had committed criminal breach of trust. In this view of the matter he directed his acquittal.
(3.) Mr. Tamba, learned Government Pleader for the State, states that the purchase version of the accused was disbelieved by the learned Magistrate. This is so, but he fairly concedes that the learned Magistrate failed to discuss the evidence of the prosecution witnesses against the accused. The learned Magistrate should have first discussed the prosecution evidence and then he should have considered the defence evidence. It is for the prosecution to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt in the first instance. The falsity of the defence version is not by itself sufficient to relieve the prosecution of the burden imposed on it to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt. The learned Sessions Judge considered the prosecution evidence and the defence evidence and then came to the conclusion that the prosecution had not proved dishonest misappropriation in this case. The learned Sessions Judge seemed to feel that the defence version was not improbable.