KALIDAS BHAVAN Vs. BHAGVANDAS SAKALCHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE tenant, who is the respondent before me, was in arrears of rent from July 1954 and therefore the landlord, the petitioner, served upon him a notice on September 5, 1954, terminating his tenancy. The two grounds stated in the notice were arrears of rent and subletting. On January 6, 1955, the petitioner filed a suit for eviction and arrears of rent. The written statement was filed by the respondent on June 20, 1955, and the first date of the hearing was June 26, 1955. On August 23, 1955, the tenant deposited Rs. 112 in Court and on August 26, 1955, he deposited Rs. 125 in Court. It is not disputed that these two amounts were more than the arrears due by the tenant on August 26, 1955. On August 31, 1955, the learned trial Judge passed a conditional decree that if all arrears of rent till the end of September 1955 were deposited by the tenant in Court before September 30, and costs of the suit, the decree for possession which the learned Judge was passing should not be executed and he should continue to remain in possession of the premises as the plaintiff's tenant. This decree was challenged by the landlord before the District Court and the learned Assistant Judge dismissed the appeal. The landlord has come now on this revision application.

(2.) MR . Rele has strenuously relied on a judgment of Mr. Justice Shah reported in Laxminarayan Nandkishore v. Keshardev Narsaria : (1956)58BOMLR1041 . Now, as Section 12 of the Rent Act constantly comes up for consideration before the Courts in the districts, I think it would be worthwhile to look at that section again and to see what is the scheme underlying that section. Before a Court construes a section of any statute it must bear in mind the object of the legislation. The Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act was passed for the benefit of the tenant. It fixed fair and reasonable rents to be paid by the tenants, it gave protection to the tenants, and it prevented landlords from evicting their tenants except in certain cases. Therefore, the legislation was clearly intended for the benefit of tenants and not landlords and every section of the Act must be construed bearing in mind that object. Section 12(1) is a bar or an impediment in the way of a landlord recovering possession of his premises, but that bar or impediment only subsists so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of this Act. In other words, the Court is debarred from passing a decree in favour of the landlord so long as the tenant satisfies these conditions. But it may be pointed out that Section 12(1) does not impose any obligation upon the Court to pass a decree in favour of the landlord if these conditions are not satisfied. If the Court has a discretion not to pass a decree under certain circumstances, that discretion has not been taken away by Section 12. Ordinarily, the Court would pass a decree in favour of the landlord, but to suggest that there is a statutory obligation upon the Court to pass a decree in favour of the landlord under Section 12(1) if the tenant does not comply with the conditions laid down is to read much more in the sub -section than the Legislature enacted. Sub -section (2) is unnecessary to be considered in this context. Then we come to Sub -section (3)(a) which deals with the statutory notice to be served by the landlord for non -payment of rent by the tenant and this statutory notice can only be served provided the arrears of rent are for six months or more and the tenant must fail to comply with the notice within one month. Then the Legislature expressly provides that the Court may pass a decree for eviction in any such suit for recovery of possession, and a Division Bench of this Court has taken the view -and I am bound by that view -that 'may' must be construed as 'shall'. Therefore, in Sub -section (3)(a) of Section 12 the discretion of the Court has been taken away and the Court is bound to pass a decree if the conditions laid down in Sub -section (3)(a) are satisfied with regard to statutory notice and default by the tenant. When we turn to Sub -section (3)(b), the language used by the Legislature is entirely different. That sub -section provides: In any other case, no decree for eviction shall be passed in any such suit if, on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter continues to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and also pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court. This is again a provision debarring the Court from passing a decree for eviction if the tenant satisfied the conditions laid down in this sub -section, and those conditions are that he must pay or tender in Court the rent on the first day of the hearing or before such other date as the Court may fix, and he must continue to pay or tender in Court the rent due till the suit is finally decided, and if the Court directs that he should pay the costs of the suit he must also pay them.

(3.) NOW , what is the position here. The tenant has paid the deposit of the full arrears before judgment was delivered. It is true that he did not deposit this amount on the first day. It is equally true that he did not formally apply to the Court for fixing some other date, nor did the Court pass any formal order fixing some other date on which he could make the payment. But I agree with the learned Assistant Judge that when the Court accepted the two deposits, in the eye of the law the Court has permitted the tenant to make these deposits and to make them on the dates on which these deposits were accepted. A deposit cannot be made in Court without the permission of the Court and the Court if knowing that the tenant has not made the deposit on the first day permits him to make the deposit on the subsequent date would in doing so, in substance if not in form, be permitting the tenant to make the deposit on the date on which it accepted the deposit. Therefore, if a strict compliance with Sub -section (3)(b) was necessary, in my opinion there is such a compliance in this case. The arrears of rent have been deposited on the two dates and the Court must be deemed to have fixed those two dates as the dates on which the tenant should pay the arrears.