DADGONDA MAHADGONDA PATIL Vs. BHAY SATYAPPA GUNDAJE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this Special Civil Application, Mr. Paranjpe has raised a short point about the competence of the Bombay Eevenue Tribunal to admit only in part a revision application preferred under Section 76 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The petitioner is the owner of survey Nos. 78/1 -2A, 78/2B, and 315/1 situated at Kupwad within the District of South Satara and he leased the said lands from the year 1947 -48 to opponent No. 1. The tenant committed defaults in payment of rent for the years 1950 -51 to 1954 -55, and on June 17, 1955, the petitioner served a notice terminating his tenancy on account of defaults in payment of rent for the said five years. In pursuance of that notice the petitioner filed an application for possession under Section 29 of the Tenancy Act on December 25, 1955. That application was disposed of by the Mamlatdar of Miraj on October 15, 1956, The Mamlatdar held that though the tenant had committed defaults by reason of his failure to make punctual payment of rent, those defaults were not intentional or wilful. On that ground the Mamlatdar exercised his discretion in favour of the tenant and held that the landlord was not entitled to possession of the lands. This decision of the Mamlatdar was confirmed in appeal filed by the petitioner to the District Deputy Collector who held that the tenant had not caused deliberate delay in payment of rent and, therefore, was entitled to be relieved against forfeiture. The appellate authority, therefore, confirmed the decision of the Mamlatdar and dismissed the petitioner's appeal. Against that decision the petitioner filed a revision application to the Revenue Tribunal and that application was heard for admission by the Tribunal on September 11, 1957. The Tribunal was of the opinion that the District Deputy Collector i.e. the Prant Officer, had exercised his discretion in favour of the tenant and that it was not, therefore, entitled to interfere. But it also found that when the discretion was exercised by the Prant Officer, no order had been passed for the payment of rent for the year 1955 -56, although the suit of the landlord had been decided by the Mamlatdar on October 15, 1956. The Revenue Tribunal, therefore, admitted the revision application for the limited purpose regarding the passing of an order for payment of rent for the year 1955 -56 and, in effect, rejected the revision application of the landlord regarding the other grounds raised in his application. That is why the landlord has come by way of this Special Civil Application under Article 227 of the Constitution.

(2.) MR . Paranjpe contends that this order of the Tribunal admitting his client's revision application for a limited purpose is without jurisdiction. The Revenue Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain a revision application under Section 76 of the Tenancy Act, and Mr. Paranjpe contends that neither this section nor the rules which have been framed regarding the procedure to be followed by the Bombay Revenue Tribunal warrant such an order as has been passed by the Tribunal. In support of his contention Mr. Paranjpe has relied on the principle enunciated in Krishnaji v. Madhusa (No. 2) (1933) 36 Bom. L.R. 451 where a Full Bench of this, Court held that under Order XLI, Rule 11, of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, if an appeal is severable, it is open to the Judge to dismiss the appeal in part and admit it in part. It is not, however, open to the Judge to admit an appeal and at the same time to restrict the grounds on which the appeal is to be heard. Mr. Paranjpe contends that the principle of this ruling would be applicable to the provisions of Section 76 of the Tenancy Act and the Revenue Tribunal would not be competent to admit a revision application only to a limited extent restricting the grounds on which the revision application is to be heard at the time of final hearing.

(3.) MR . Kulkarni, who appears on behalf of the tenant, has, in the first instance, contended that at the time of the final hearing, it would be open to the petitioner to argue that the order of the Revenue Tribunal restricting the admission of the revision application for a limited purpose is erroneous. We cannot accept this argument. It is clear from the judgment of the Revenue Tribunal that it went into the question raised by the landlord that the discretion exercised by the Prant Officer was improper and decided against the landlord with regard to that contention. Notice, therefore, would be issued in the revision to the tenant only with regard to the ground that was left open, viz. as to whether the Prant Officer erred in not passing an order for the payment of rent by the tenant for the year 1955 -56.