SAHADEO SHANKARRAO THOOL Vs. SHIODAS PRALHAD DHANKE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The unsuccessful defendant Nos.2 and 3 in this case are appellants, challenging the concurrent findings rendered against them by the two Courts below. This appeal arises out of partition suit filed by respondent Nos.1 to 3 against their grandmother being defendant no.1, the purchasers of the suit property i.e. defendant nos.2 and 3 (appellants herein) and defendant nos.4 to 6, who were sisters of the plaintiffs. The husband of defendant no.1 Champat died somewhere around 1943, the date not being clear from the record, but the year was admittedly 1943. After his death, his widow Sonibai (defendant no.1) adopted Pralhad on 13/4/1949, by a registered adoption deed. The plaintiffs herein are the wife and two sons of said Pralhad (adopted son). It is discernible from the record that on 2/5/1973, the said defendant cancelled the adoption deed by executing a registered document (Exh.200), claiming that her adopted son i.e. Pralhad was not taking care of her and therefore, she was constrained to cancel the adoption. Thereafter, on 18/7/1973, the defendant no.1 sold part of the suit property to defendant no.2. Subsequently, on 7/11/1984, said Pralhad (adopted son) died. On 29/4/1986 said defendant no.2, in turn, sold the said part of the suit property to defendant no.3.

(2.) The plaintiffs i.e. respondent nos.1 to 3 herein, on 5/12/1996, filed suit for partition and separation possession in respect of the suit property specified in schedules A and B of the plaint. Schedule A contained details of agricultural lands, including survey no.141/2 situated in village Nimboli, Tq.Chandur Rly, District Amravati, which was subject matter of sale deeds executed as aforesaid. Schedule B pertained to two house properties. The plaintiffs claimed partition of the said suit properties and further claimed that the defendant no.1 was not entitled to execute sale deed in respect of part of the suit property in favour of defendant no.2, who had in turn sold it to the defendant no.3. The defendant nos.1 to 3 being the contesting parties, opposed the prayers made on behalf of the plaintiffs in the suit. It was the stand of defendant no.1 that, having cancelled the adoption deed on 2/5/1973, she was the sole owner of the suit property and that she was entitled to execute the sale deed in respect thereof. The defendant Nos.2 and 3 also contested the claims of the plaintiffs on similar grounds. On the basis of the evidence and material on record, the Trial Court framed 14 issues. These included issue pertaining to effect of cancellation of the adoption deed on 2/5/1973 and as to whether the defendant no.1 had become absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of sec. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. These issues went to the very root of the matter, because findings on them would decide the fate of not only the suit, but the extent to which the purchasers were entitled to lay their claim on the suit property.

(3.) By its judgment and order dtd. 25/3/1994, the Trial Court found that defendant no.1 could not be said to have become absolute owner of the suit property under Sec. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, because after the death of her husband Champat in 1943, the intervening event of adoption of Pralhad by her on 13/4/1949 had a direct impact on her claim of being an absolute owner of the suit property. It was further held by the Trial Court that the adoption of Pralhad was under Hindu Law and such an adoption could not have been cancelled. On this basis, the Trial Court accepted contention of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit, thereby specifying the share to which the parties were entitled. It was held that the sale deed executed by defendant no.1 in favour of defendant no.2 and the subsequent sale deed executed in favour of defendant no.3 were not binding on the shares as claimed by the parties.