MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER MUMBAI OFFICE OF EDUCATION DEPARTMENT Vs. VRUNDA VIJAYKUMAR KULKARNI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present petition challenges orders passed by the controlling authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and the Industrial Court in an appeal from that order.

(2.) The Respondent was working as a teacher in a private aided primary school. She superannuated on 31 August 2013. She claimed gratuity from the Petitioner corporation as part of salary aid and approached the controlling authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 ("Act") for the same. The learned Labour Judge, acting as controlling authority under the Act, issued notice to the Petitioner corporation. Since the corporation remained absent, the matter was heard ex parte. The controlling authority, by its impugned order, granted the Respondent's application for gratuity and ordered the corporation to pay gratuity in the sum of Rs. 10 lakhs to the Respondent. The corporation thereafter applied for setting aside of the ex parte order and restoration of the application. The application was rejected by the Labour Court. The corporation thereafter preferred an appeal under Section 7(7) of the Act challenging both orders, i.e. the order originally passed by the controlling authority under Section 7(4) and the order passed under Rule 11(5) of the Rules framed thereunder on the application for restoration. The Industrial Court dismissed the appeal. The Industrial Court upheld the order of the Labour Court rejecting the corporation's application for restoration, treating it as an application for review and, thus, barred under Rule 11(5). The court held that there was a delay of about 5 months and 17 days in filing the application for review.

(3.) Though the impugned order of the Industrial Court in appeal cannot be faulted per se on consideration of Rule 11(5) of the Rules or, for that matter, the bar of limitation under Section 7(7) for filing an appeal from the original order, Mr.Pakale, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, submits that since the order of the controlling authority is a complete nullity, the considerations of limitation apart, this court ought to quash the same on merits as an order nonest or wholly without jurisdiction.