SUBHASHKUMAR GULABCHAND GELADA Vs. ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition takes exception to the judgment and order passed by the Additional Collector, Yavatmal, dated 31st August 1994 in Rent Control Appeal No. 8/71/93-94 of Wani. The petitioner is the landlord in respect of two rooms and two chhapris on the western side of the house situated on Plot No. 272, 273 and 274 of Sheet No. 19/3 of Wani town. The respondent No.3 is the monthly tenant in respect of the said premises. The monthly rent is stated to be Rs. 40 per month. The petitioner applied to the Rent Controller for permission to initiate eviction proceedings against the respondent in respect of the said premises under Clause 13(3) (vi) and (vii) of the Rent Control Order. The Rent Controller, on analysing the material on record, acceded to the petitioner's request and granted permission under Clause 13 (3) (vi) and (vii) of the CP and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 to issue quit notice to the respondent tenant and initiate eviction proceedings against him in relation to the suit premises.

(2.) THE respondent carried the said decision of the Rent Controller in Appeal before the Additional Collector, Yavatmal. The Appellate Authority, on the other hand, reappreciated the evidence on record and took an opposite view of the matter. The Appellate Authority while adverting to certain material, which were not considered by the lower Authority, proceeded to accept the stand of the respondent and consequently declined to grant permission as prayed by the petitioner on both the counts.

(3.) AFTER having considered the rival submissions and on going through the material on record with the assistance of counsel for the parties, the first question that needs to be addressed is whether the Appellate Court has committed any manifest error or, for that matter, the opinion recorded by the Appellate Authority is perverse and not supported by the material on record. For that purpose, we shall straightaway proceed to analyse the reasons which weighed with the Appellate Authority while considering the ground of bona fide requirement under clause 13 (3) (vi). The Appellate Authority first adverted to the pleadings and thereafter oral evidence of the parties as well as documentary evidence produced by them. The Appellate Authority in the first place, noted that the petitioner has not chosen to examine any other witness except himself to show that there are how many members in his (landlord's) family. That the sale-deed dated 7.4.1984 was not filed on record. The premises in possession of tenant were only two rooms and chhapris. That there was no evidence to indicate the exact portion and rooms of the house consisting of how much rooms purchased by the petitioner under the sale deed dated 7th April,1984. On the other hand, petitioner has admitted in his cross-examination that the said house is purchased by his father for himself and that his father had a separate business. The plea of the appellant that there was already a partition between the petitioner and his father is also adverted to by the Appellate Authority. It then proceeded to hold that there was no documentary evidence about the partition placed on record so as to establish the fact that there was a pressing need of the house in possession of the tenant on account of that partition. The Appellate Authority has also noticed that petitioner has admitted that he has purchased another property which is vacant plot under registered sale deed dated 19th August, 1983. The Appellate Authority has, then, noticed that the petitioner in his cross-examination accepted that three storied house near the suit building has been purchased by his father, but appellant claims to have no information about the said purchase. In substance, the Appellate Authority proceeded to hold that all these crucial aspects have not been adverted to by the lower Authority, which finding of the Appellate Court is unexceptional. Once these aspects were to be reckoned, the view taken by the Appellate Authority that from the material on record, it is clear that the petitioner himself owns open plot purchased by him in the year 1983 stood established and that if there was pressing need for the petitioner for his own bona fide need, he could have constructed house on the said plot, instead of purchasing dilapidated house in which the respondent was occupying two rooms and two chhapris on the western portion, as monthly tenant. Thus understood, the Appellate Authority proceeded to hold that the petitioner failed to make out a case of bona fide need and declined to grant permission as prayed on that count. In so far as the view taken by the Appellate Authority on appreciating the evidence on record, being a possible view, I have no hesitation in observing that no interference is warranted in exercise of writ jurisdiction.