SARJERAO BHAURAO EKAL Vs. S K PANT WALAWALKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution impugns the Judgment and Order dated 9/4/1996 rendered by the learned Member of the Industrial Court at Kolhapur thereby allowing Revision Application (ULP) No.3 of 1995 and consequently the order passed by the Labour Court on 22/12/1992 holding that the Remand Home is an Industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 came to be set aside. The Labour Court was further directed to return/dismiss Complaint (ULP) No. 150 of 1994.

(2.) The present petitioner came to be employed as a Clerk-cum-Typist with effect from 6/1/1990 by Dr.Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan Remand Home, Kolhapur and the said Remand Home was being managed by the Zilla Parviksha Va Anuraksha Sanghatana (District Probation and After Care Association)(for short referred to as the Association). The said Association has its own constitution providing for its aims and objects which include the protection of the children s rights and their rehabilitation. Undoubtedly, the Remand Home is established for the purpose of development of children who are destitute or orphans and below the age of 16 years are normally admitted to the Remand Home. It appears that disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner sometimes in the year 1993 by issuing a charge-sheet for the alleged acts of misconduct. The explanation submitted by the petitioner was not found satisfactory and, therefore, a departmental enquiry was conducted, the enquiry officer held the petitioner guilty and the said report was accepted by the Association. Consequently, by an order dated 12/5/1994 the petitioner was dismissed from service by way of punishment. The said order came to be challenged in Complaint (ULP) No. 150 of 1994 filed under Section 28(1) read with Items 1(a) to (g) of Schedule IV of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 (for short the Act). In the said complaint the Association filed an application contending that it is not an Industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act and, therefore, the complaint was not maintainable. The Association prayed for the said preliminary point to be decided as raised in its application at Exh.12. After hearing both the parties, the said application was rejected by the learned Judge of the Labour Court on 22/12/1994 and as noted earlier the same order was challenged in Revision Application (ULP) No.3 of 1995 which has been allowed by the Industrial Court.

(3.) The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner referred to the written arguments placed on record and contended that the order passed in Writ Petition No. 2281/1985 by this Court on 7-7-1985 was an order of summary dismissal and, therefore, not being reasoned out, it would not be binding on the Courts. The Learned Counsel had heavily relied upon another decision of this Court in the case of President, Anath Mahila Ashram v/s. Smt.J.G.Ajgaonkar (Writ Petition No. 4513 of 1991, unreported) and submitted that the charity trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 is an "industry" under section 2(j) of the Act, by following the law laid down in the case of Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board V/s. Rajappa & Ors. (AIR 1978 SC 548). As per the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the Respondent Association is also a charitable trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 and it would fall within the ambit of the term "industry". As per the Learned Counsel the Labour Court was right in holding that the Respondent Association is an "industry" as defined under Section 2(j) of the Act and the said finding is duly supported by the subsequent decision of this Court in the case of Smt.J.G.Ajagaonkar (supra). Consequently, the view taken by the Industrial Court in the impugned order is unsustainable and the petition deserves to be allowed.