LAWS(BOM)-2008-6-11

LATA VISHWANATH GAWADE Vs. VISHWANATH JAYWANT GAWADE

Decided On June 18, 2008
LATA VISHWANATH GAWADE Appellant
V/S
VISHWANATH JAYWANT GAWADE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petition has been filed to challenge the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune, in Criminal Revision application No. 624 of 1999. This order was passed on 22-5-2000 holding that the petitioner was not entitled to the maintenance awarded to her under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

(2.) THE facts giving rise to the present petition are as follows : the petitioner and the respondent No. 1 were married in 1982. They have a son who was born in 1984. However, since that year they have been living separately. An order for maintenance was passed by the J. M. F. C. , Khed on 11-2-1994 on an application filed by the petitioner in the year 1990. The respondent no. 1 was directed to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month to the petitioner and at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month to their son from the date of filing of the application.

(3.) AGGRIEVED by this order, an application was filed by the respondent no. 1 under section 127 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code in the year 1996 contending that the order granting maintenance should be vacated. The main contention in the application was that a decree had been obtained by the husband-respondent No. 1 for restitution of conjugal rights on 13-2-1995. This was an ex parte decree. It was contended that the petitioner had not returned to the matrimonial home in order to cohabit with the 1st respondent. The application was dismissed by the J. M. F. C. on 21-2-1998 by observing that the respondent no. 1 had failed to prove that the petitioner had wilfully disobeyed the decree in m. P. No. 50 of 1995 i. e. the decree for restitution of the conjugal rights. The j. M. F. C. observed that it was merely a bare decree since the respondent No. 1 had made no efforts for executing that decree. It further observed that the order of maintenance passed in favour of the petitioner and her son could not be brushed aside only because there was an order of restitution of conjugal rights.