VILE PARLE MAHILA SANGH Vs. RAJARAM SITARAM RAHATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Rule, by consent of Counsel returnable forthwith. Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent waives service. By consent of Counsel and at their request taken up for hearing and final disposal.

(2.) These proceedings arise out of an order passed by the Labour Court in an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The first respondent was initially employed as a Peon by the petitioner on a temporary basis with effect from February 1, 1993. The petitioner conducts a school in the English ana Marathi media of instruction. The first respondent had instituted a complaint of unfair labour practices under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, inter alia seeking the benefit of permanency in service. By an order dated March 19, 2003, the Industrial Court allowed the complaint and issued a declaration that the petitioner had engaged in an unfair labour practice under Items 6 and 9 of Schedule IV. The petitioner was directed to grant permanency to the first respondent with effect from March 1, 1999 and to pay arrears on the basis thereof. The operative part of the order passed by Industrial Court reads as follows:

(3.) The first respondent has instituted a petition before this Court in order to challenge the direction of the Industrial Court granting him permanency from March 1, 1999 and not from February 1, 1993 as claimed in the complaint. The Writ Petition is pending before this Court. In the meantime, the first respondent instituted an application under Section 33-C(2) (Application (IDA) 227/2000) claiming wages for the period between January 1, 1993 to .December 31, 1998 and thereafter until 5 December 2002. The Labour Court rejected the application. In a Writ Petition before this Court, a Learned Single Judge of this Court by an order dated March 21, 2005 upheld the order of the Labour Court and held that once the Industrial Court had granted permanency only with effect from March 1, 1999, the Labour Court could not under Section 33-C(2) decide whether the difference in wages could be paid to the first respondent herein on the basis that he was a s permanent workman with effect from February 1, 1993.