(1.) THIS Writ Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the Judgment and Decree passed by the End additional District Judge, Raigad, Alibag dated 3rd January, 1994 in Civil appeal No. 81 of 1989. By this Judgment, the Appellate Court allowed the appeal preferred by the landlord and decreed the Suit for possession filed by the landlord on the ground that the petitioner/tenant had committed default within the meaning of section 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ).
(2.) PRESENT Petition raises limited controversy as to whether the conclusion reached by the Appellate Court on this aspect is appropriate. To appreciate the controversy, the reference can be made to the admitted facts. It is admitted position that suit notice was issued on 2nd October, 1985 demanding arrears of rent for the period between February, 1985 to September, 1985. It is asserted in the suit notice that the tenancy created in favour of the petitioners' predecessor was monthly tenancy and the rent of Rs. 35/- (Rupees Thirty Five) was payable on monthly basis. It is not in dispute that the demand notice was received by the predecessor of the petitioners (tenant) on 7th October, 1985. The tenant did not remit the amount as demanded in the suit notice nor filed the application for standard rent disputing his liability to pay the amount of rent as demanded by the respondent/landlord within the statutory period. As a result, the landlord was left with no option but to institute Suit for possession.
(3.) IN addition to the ground of default, the landlord also asked for possession on other counts, which, however, has not been accepted by the Court below. The Appellate Court as aforesaid, for the first time, decreed the Suit in favour of the landlord on the ground of default within the meaning of section 12 (3) (a) of the Act. It is also not in dispute that the tenant deposited the arrears of rent for the first time in Court on 9th September, 1986. On these admitted facts, the Appellate Court proceeded to hold that provisions of section 12 (3) (a) of the act were squarely applicable to the fact situation of the present case. Indeed, the trial was pending when section 12 of the Act was amended in the year 1977. However, it is now well established position that the amended provisions would not apply retrospectively. In the present case, therefore, amended provisions have no application.